Afro-Eurasiatic Geopolitics, the New Silk Roads, the Indo-Pacific Region, the Collapse of the West, and the End of the Fake History of ‘Greco-Roman Civilization’
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 30 Αυγούστου 2019.
Στο κείμενό του αυτό, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης παρουσιάζει ορισμένα από τα δεδομένα τα οποία παρουσίασα σε μια ομιλία μου στο Πεκίνο τον Ιανουάριο του 2019. Κατά την ομιλία μου περιέγραψα τρόπους αντι-αποικιοκρατικής συνεργασίας των εθνών της Αφρο-Ευρασίας και του Ινδο-Ειρηνικού Συμπλέγματος πάνω στην κοινή τους πολιτισμική κληρονομιά και πολιτιστική παράδοση. Αυτές βρίσκονται στους αντίποδες εκείνων των αποικιοκρατικών χωρών (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, Ολλανδία, ΗΠΑ, Αυστραλία) και αντιστρατεύονται τα ρατσιστικά δόγματα και τις ιστορικές διαστρεβλώσεις που οι εν λόγω χώρες χρησιμοποιούν ως εργαλεία διαφθοράς και εξάρτησης. Επίσης, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης προσθέτει πολλά ενδιαφέροντα στοιχεία για το Eastern Economic Forum 2019, το οποίο είναι ένα εξαιρετικό βήμα ανταλλαγής γνωμών, αναλύσεων και προοπτικών ανάμεσα σε αρχηγούς κρατών, στελέχη κυβερνήσεων, επιχειρηματίες, στρατιωτικούς, βουλευτές, ακαδημαϊκούς και δημοσιογράφους από τις χώρες της Ασίας και του Ινδο-Ειρηνικού συμπλέγματος.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/08/30/αφρο-ευρασιατική-γεωπολιτική-οι-νέοι/ ===================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Τίποτα δεν υπογραμμίζει καλύτερα την αποδυνάμωση και αποσύνθεση του δυτικού κόσμου καλύτερα από την οικτρή εικόνα της τελευταίας συνάντησης των αρχηγών κρατών μελών της οργάνωσης G-7 στο Μπιαρίτς της Γαλλίας. Το 45ο G7 summit αναφέρθηκε στο ενδεχόμενο επιστροφής της Ρωσσίας στην οργάνωση και συνεπώς μετατροπής της και πάλι σε G -8, αλλά την καλύτερη απάντηση σ’ αυτή την ιδέα έδωσε το ρωσσικό think tank Valdai Club που πρόσκειται στον Ρώσσο πρόεδρο.
Σημειώνοντας ότι το G-7 δεν έχει πλέον την σημασία που είχε προ 20 ετών, το εν λόγω ίδρυμα σε σχετική δημοσίευσή του (δείτε παρακάτω) αναρωτήθηκε τι έχει πλέον σημασία, το G-7 ή το G-20!
Λεπτομέρειες υπάρχουν πολλές (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/45th_G7_summit), αλλά η πραγματικότητα φαίνεται σε λίγους μόνον αριθμούς:
Οι χώρες του G-7 (ΗΠΑ, Ιαπωνία, Γερμανία, Αγγλία, Γαλλία, Ιταλία και Καναδάς) με 766 εκ. πληθυσμό διαθέτουν μαζί το 30.1% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ (σε αντιστοιχία αγοραστικής δύναμης / purchasing power parity).
Αλλά οι πέντε χώρες των BRICS (Κίνα, Ινδία, Ρωσσία, Βραζιλία, Νοτιοαφρικανική Ένωση) με 3165 εκ. εκπροσωπούν το 32.7% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ, όντας έτσι πιο σημαντικές από το G-7, το οποίο είναι πολιτικά διαιρεμένο και οικονομικά κλυδωνιζόμενο.
Από την άλλη πλευρά, οι υπόλοιπες 7 χώρες του G-20 (το οποίο αποτελείται από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και 19 χώρες, οι οποίες απαρτίζονται από τους BRICS, το G-7 και άλλες 7 χώρες), ήτοι Ινδονησία, Μεξικό, Τουρκία, Νότια Κορέα, Αργεντινή, Σαουδική Αραβία, και Αυστραλία, με 633 εκ. πληθυσμό έχουν το 10.8% του παγκοσμίου ΑΕΠ.
Με άλλα λόγια το G- 20 εκπροσωπεί το 75% της παγκόσμιας οικονομίας, μη αφήνοντας εκτός καμμιά παγκοσμίως σημαντική χώρα.
Αλλά το πολύ εντυπωσιακό δεδομένο (συγκριτικά με τον κόσμο προ 20 ή 30 ετών) είναι ότι μαζί οι Ινδονησία, Μεξικό, Τουρκία, Νότια Κορέα, Αργεντινή, Σαουδική Αραβία, και Αυστραλία διαθέτουν ήδη περισσότερο από το 1/3 του ΑΕΠ των χωρών μελών του G-7. Αυτό από μόνο του δείχνει πόση ισχύς έχει χαθεί από τις παλιές μεγάλες οικονομίες της Δυτικής Ευρώπης, Βόρειας Αμερικής, και Ιαπωνίας (που κάποτε απεκαλούντο ‘ο πρώτος κόσμος’). Για το G- 20 θα βρείτε λεπτομέρειες εδώ:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G20
Αν στα παραπάνω συνυπολογιστούν η δυναμική της οικονομίας των εκτός του G-7 χωρών, το δημογραφικό πρόβλημα (το οποίο είτε είναι πολύ σοβαρό είτε προξενεί πολιτικές αναταραχές στην αντιμετώπισή του) και ο εκπαιδευτικός – επιστημονικός – μορφωτικός παράγοντας, τότε συμπεραίνουμε ότι η καταβαράθρωση της Δύσης θα είναι γρήγορη και απόλυτη. Αυτή η διάλυση θα είναι μάλιστα γενική και όχι μόνον οικονομική-πολιτική. Μαζί με την Δύση, θα βουλιάξει όλο το ιδεολόγημα που προέκυψε από την Αναγεννησιακή Ευρώπη και έφθασε στις μέρες μας.
Άλλωστε, η Γερμανία είναι η Γερμανία του αφηγήματος του ‘ελληνορωμαϊκού ή ιουδαιοχριστιανικού πολιτισμού’, όσο παραμένει πληθυσμιακά όπως την ξέρουμε μέχρι σήμερα. Το ίδιο κι η Γαλλία, η Ιταλία ή η Αγγλία. Αλλά μια Γερμανία κατακλυσμένη από Τούρκους, Ιρανούς, Αφγανούς, Τουρκμένους κι Ιρακινούς αναγκαστικά χρειάζεται άλλο αφήγημα – κάτι που να την φέρνει κοντά στον Ταμερλάνο, στην Χρυσή Ορδή και στον Χουλάγκου Χαν.
Όλα αυτά φαίνονται ήδη πολύ καθαρά από τους κινητήριους μοχλούς σκέψης, τις γενικώτερες θεωρήσεις της Παγκόσμιας Ιστορίας, τις μεγάλες αναζητήσεις, και τις βασικές κατευθυντήριες γραμμές των κυριωτέρων σχεδίων που υλοποιούν οι εκτός του G-7 μεγάλες δυνάμεις. Η ανάδειξη της Κίνας σε πρώτη υπερδύναμη βγάζει αυτόματα τον Περικλή, τον Θουκυδίδη και τον Ιούλιο Καίσαρα από το επίκεντρο της Ιστορίας και εκεί τοποθετεί τον Κινέζο αυτοκράτορα Σουζόν (Suzong), ο οποίος έγραψε στον χαλίφη της Βαγδάτης ζητώντας του βοήθεια και στρατό για να καταστείλει την επανάσταση Αν Λουσάν ή τον ιδρυτή της δυναστείας Μιν αυτοκράτορα Χουνβού (Hongwu), ο οποίος το 1368 έγραψε ένα ποίημα 100 λέξεων για να εξυμνήσει τον Μωάμεθ Προφήτη του Ισλάμ.
Δεν είναι θέμα καν επιλογής ανάμεσα σε μια αλήθεια κι ένα ψέμμα. Είναι κάτι πολύ πιο μακριά από αυτό. Είναι θέμα ότι ‘αυτό’ ήταν η δική ‘σου’ αλήθεια και ‘εκείνο’ ήταν η δική ‘του’ αλήθεια, και τελικά αποδεικνύεται ότι η δική ‘σου’ αλήθεια (ακόμη κι αν είναι αληθινή) δεν είναι η πιο σημαντική, ή η πιο καθοριστική.
Πάρτε για παράδειγμα την βασική γεωπολιτική της Κίνας! Η Ευρώπη, ιδωμένη από το Πεκίνο, γίνεται νοητή ως μία χερσόνησος της Ασίας, δηλαδή κάτι σαν μια άλλη Ινδία, ενώ η Ασία κι η Αφρική νοούνται ως μία ενότητα γης της οποίας τα πολλά τμήματα είναι αλληλεξαρτώμενα, αλληλοσυνδεόμενα και αλληλοσυνεργαζόμενα, καθώς αποτελούν μια ενότητα. Και ακριβώς αυτή την θεώρηση αλλά και μέθοδο έρευνας κι ερμηνείας της Ιστορίας υλοποιεί το μεγαλόπνοο σχέδιο της Κίνας που εν συντομία αποκαλείται Νέος Δρόμος του Μεταξιού {Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ή One Belt One Road (OBOR); Один пояс и один путь; 一带一路}. Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative
https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/一带一路
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Один_пояс_и_один_путь
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/One_Belt,_One_Road
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRACECA
Η ιστορική επιστροφή στους – κατά ξηράν, έρημον και θάλασσαν – Δρόμους του Μεταξιού ντε φάκτο συνενώνει την αφρο-ευρασιατική γήινη έκταση, σβύννοντας ψεύτικες κι αναθεωρητικές γραμμές που είχαν επιβάλει οι διάφοροι αποικιοκράτες και οριενταλιστές. Ψευτο-γεωπολιτικές παρουσιάσεις που χωρίζουν την Αφρο-Ευρασία πετιούνται εκ των πραγμάτων στα σκουπίδια ως ιστορικά ανυπόστατες και ως οικονομικά – πολιτικά άχρηστες και βλαβερές. Η Ενδιάμεση Περιοχή του Δημήτρη Κιτσίκη δεν υπάρχει: ήταν μια στρεβλή κι άχρηστη επινόησή του.
Το ίδιο έχει να κάνει και με το ρατσιστικό αφήγημα των αποικιοκρατών του 18ου και του 19ου αιώνα. Άγγλοι και Γάλλοι αποικιοκράτες, ακριβώς για να επιβάλλουν την αποικιοκρατία τους, επιχείρησαν να αναθεωρήσουν την Ιστορία και να αρνηθούν το τι μέχρι τότε είχε συμβεί.
Η αναθεώρηση της Ιστορίας που οι Αγγλογάλλοι ελληνιστές, λατινιστές κι οριενταλιστές επέβαλαν είχε να κάνει με
α. μια παρά φύσιν και ψεύτικη διαίρεση του κόσμου σε Ανατολή και Δύση,
β. μια ανιστόρητη κι αυθαίρετη ταύτιση της Δύσης με πολιτισμό και πρόοδο και της Ανατολής με βαρβαρότητα κι ‘απολυταρχία’ (λες κι η ‘απολυταρχία’ είναι κάτι το οπωσδήποτε κακό!),
γ. μια παρανοϊκή κι εξωπραγματική αναγωγή του λεγόμενου ‘ελληνορωμαϊκού πολιτισμού’ σε επίκεντρο της Παγκόσμιας Ιστορίας, κάτι που αντιστρατευόταν τις ίδιες τις ιστορικές πηγές, και
δ. μια ολότελα αφελή ταύτιση των νεώτερων Ευρωπαίων με τους αρχαίους Ρωμαίους, Έλληνες και ακόμη τους Μυκηναίους και τους Μινωΐτες της 2ης προχριστιανικής χιλιετίας σε μια οικτρά ρατσιστική απόπειρα να παρουσιασθεί το παρελθόν των Ευρωπαίων αποικιοκρατών ως ‘ανώτερο’ και ‘αρχαιότερο’ εκείνου των εθνών των αγγλικών και γαλλικών αποικιών.
Όλα αυτά τα ψευδή, αυθαίρετα κι ανιστόρητα ‘αξιώματα’ επιβλήθηκαν με τυραννικές μεθόδους στην Ασία, την Αφρική κι ακόμη την Ευρώπη, αλλά εις μάτην.
Με την αναφορά στην αλήθεια των Ιστορικών Δρόμων του Μεταξιού, η Ιστορία επιστρέφει, οι αναθεωρητικές και ρατσιστικές απόψεις των νεώτερων Ευρωπαίων για ‘ελληνορωμαϊκό’ ή ‘ιουδαιοχριστιανικό’ πολιτισμό σβύννονται, και η ισότιμη συμμετοχή όλων των εθνών στο μελλοντικό γίγνεσθαι στηρίζεται στην πραγματική Ιστορία, την έρευνά της, την εκμάθησή της, την διάδοσή της, χωρίς τους εθνοκεντρικούς και ιδεολογικούς, παραποιητικούς φακούς.
Ποια ήταν λοιπόν η Ιστορική Αλήθεια των Δρόμων του Μεταξιού που επιστρέφει για να γίνει κτήμα όλων όσων θα συμμετέχουν στην εξέλιξη της Ανθρωπότητας;
Ένα πλήθος εθνών συμμετείχαν στις εμπορικές, μορφωτικές, θρησκευτικές και γενικώτερα πολιτισμικές ανταλλαγές μεταξύ Ρώμης, Συρίας Αλεξάνδρειας, Ανατολικής Αφρικής, Ινδίας, Ινδοκίνας-Ινδονησίας, Μεσοποταμίας, Ιράν, Κεντρικής Ασίας, Σιβηρίας και Κίνας.
Έλληνες, Ρωμαίοι και γενικώτερα οι ευρωπαϊκοί λαοί επηρεάστηκαν κατακλυσμικά από ανατολικές λατρείες, μυστικισμούς, θρησκείες, θεουργίες, τέχνες, τρόπους ζωής και πολιτισμούς, και μάλιστα είχαν συνείδηση αυτού του συμβάντος.
Η αυτοκρατορική Ρώμη ήταν μια ασιατική πρωτεύουσα, ένα αντίγραφο της Περσέπολης, της Βαβυλώνας, ή ακόμη της Νινευή. Κάθε αρχαιοελληνική ‘επίδραση’ στην Ρώμη είχε πλέον ολότελα σβυσθεί.
Αν και μεγάλο κράτος, η Ρώμη πολύ περισσότερο επηρεάστηκε παρά επηρέασε άλλα έθνη πάνω στους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού, των Μπαχαρικών και των Αρωμάτων (Λιβανωτών). Έθνη που έπαιξαν καθοριστικό ρόλο στην ανάπτυξη αυτού του ιστορικού φαινομένου ήταν οι Ιρανοί, οι Αραμαίοι, οι Τουρανοί, οι Σογδιανοί, κι οι Υεμενίτες.
Οι Έλληνες αποδέχθηκαν τον Μιθραϊσμό, τις Ισιακές Λατρείες, Μυστήρια και Θεολογία, τον Μανιχεϊσμό, την Χριστιανωσύνη, και άλλα ανατολικά θρησκευτικά συστήματα.
Κανένας Αιγύπτιος, Βαβυλώνιος, Αραμαίος, Ιρανός ή Τουρανός δεν ενδιαφέρθηκε να μεταφράσει τα έπη του Ομήρου ή τους πλατωνικούς διαλόγους στα προχριστιανικά χρόνια.
Και κανένας Αιγύπτιος Βαβυλώνιος, Αραμαίος, Ιρανός ή Τουρανός δεν ελάτρευσε τον Ποσειδώνα ή την Αθηνά.
Αλλά η αποικιοκρατική και ρατσιστική, ευρωπαϊκή ακαδημαϊκή τάξη του 19ου και του 20ου αιώνα, αντί να αποκαλέσει την περίοδο από τον Αλέξανδρο έως τον Οκταβιανό ‘ανατολιστικά χρόνια’ (επειδή τότε σημειώθηκαν ανατολικές επιδράσεις πάνω σε Έλληνες, Ρωμαίους κι άλλους Ευρωπαίους), την ονόμασε ‘ελληνιστικά χρόνια’ (επειδή ορισμένοι ασιατικοί λαοί, όπως οι Φρύγες, οι Λυδοί, οι Κάρες, οι Λύκιοι κι οι Καππαδόκες εξελληνίστηκαν γλωσσικά).
Οι Ευρωπαίοι αποικιοκράτες έβλεπαν εαυτούς στην Ασία ως συνεχιστές εκείνων από τους Έλληνες στρατιώτες του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου που έμειναν σε διάφορα σημεία της Ασίας, ανήγειραν πόλεις, διατήρησαν την τέχνη τους.
Αλλά αυτό ήταν μια αυθαίρετη ασυναρτησία που δεν δημιουργεί Ιστορία.
Αντίθετα από την ρατσιστική, εθνοκεντρική διαστροφή της Ιστορίας που ήταν το επακόλουθο του αποικιοκρατικού αφηγήματος, η νέα αφρο-ευρασιατική γεωπολιτική πραγματικότητα και οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού δεν αφήνουν κανένα περιθώριο – ειμή μόνον τον εξευτελισμό – σε όσους επιμένουν να μιλάνε εθνοκεντρικά και να βλέπουν μια ‘ιστορική ανωτερότητα’ για τους προγόνους τους.
Όσοι άθλιοι κι αμόρφωτοι στην Ελλάδα μιλάνε υποτιμητικά για Μογγόλους μόνο γελοιοποιούν την Ελλάδα και δείχνουν ότι η χώρα είναι ένα άχρηστο σκουπίδι μιας περασμένης εποχής.
Άλλωστε οι πρόγονοι αυτών των σημερινών αμορρφώτων Ελλήνων πήγαιναν πριν από 600 χρόνια στην Κεντρική Ασία για να σπουδάσουν σε αστεροσκοπεία με Μογγόλους καθηγητές.
Όταν υλοποιείται ένα τόσο σημαντικό, κοσμοϊστορικό σχέδιο, όπως οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού, ισχυρές χώρες προσπαθούν να βρουν καλύτερους τρόπους να ενταχθούν σ’ αυτό και προς τούτο η ιστορία κι η γεωγραφία μελετούνται υπό διαφορετικά πρίσματα, αναπτύσσονται νέες συνθέσεις, και επινοούνται συμπληρωματικές ερμηνείες και προσεγγίσεις.
Το Ινδο-Ειρηνικό Σύμπλεγμα είναι μια καθαρά ινδική θέση που επινοήθηκε για να ενισχύσει την θέση της Ινδίας μέσα στους Νέους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού.
Ιστορικά στηρίζεται στους τεκμηριωμένους θαλάσσιους εμπορικούς δρόμους, οι οποίοι κυρίως χρησίμευαν για την μετακίνηση μπαχαρικών, λιβανωτών και άλλων προϊόντων και είχαν φέρει κοντά την Ανατολική Αφρική, την Ινδία, την Ινδοκίνα και την Ινδονησία.
Στα σύγχρονα πλαίσια, μια τέτοια προσέγγιση συμφέρει την Ινδία, επειδή το Δελχί, βάζοντας έτσι στο αφρο-ευρασιατικό παιχνίδι σημαντικές οικονομίες όπως η Ινδονησία κι η Αυστραλία αλλά κι η Ανατολική Αφρική, λειτουργεί εξισορροπητικά απέναντι στην εμφανή κυριαρχία της Κίνας στο καθαρά ηπειρωτικό ευρασιατικό επίπεδο.
Αυτό είναι μια πολύ γνωστή τακτική στις διεθνείς σχέσεις: διευρύνεις το πεδίο ανταγωνισμού, όταν σε πιο ‘στενά’ όρια γίνεσαι ουραγός. Αλλά δείχνει ότι η Ινδία καταλαβαίνει ότι οι Νέοι Δρόμοι του Μεταξιού είναι μονόδρομος των παγκοσμίων εξελίξεων. Και όπως είναι εύκολο να καταλάβει ο οποιοσδήποτε, είτε μουσουλμάνοι είτε ινδουϊστές, οι Ινδοί περιμένουν ανυπόμονα την ημέρα που οι παλιές αποικιοκρατικές δυνάμεις Γαλλία κι Αγγλία θα έχουν απομείνει με τόση ισχύ διεθνώς όση και η Σρι Λάνκα ή η Μαλαισία.
Αντίθετα, το σύνολο του αμόρφωτου, άρρωστου και ουσιαστικά σάπιου ελληνικού πολιτικού, πανεπιστημιακού και δημοσιογραφικού κατεστημένου εξακολουθεί να νομίζει ότι η Ελλάδα μπορεί να επιβιώσει μέσα στον σημερινό κόσμο είτε με προσήλωση στις παλιές συμμαχίες (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, ΕΕ, ΗΠΑ, ΝΑΤΟ), είτε με ελπίδες στηριγμένες στην ξεκάρφωτη, έωλη κι ανυπόστατη συμμαχία με το Ισραήλ και την Αίγυπτο.
Η αλήθεια είναι ότι η Ιστορία θα κτυπήσει τραγικά το νεώτερο αναθεωρητικό ψευτοκράτος Ελλάδα, όταν οι δημιουργοί του (Γαλλία, Αγγλία) παύσουν να υφίστανται.
Τόσο θα καταλάβουν όλοι οι Ρωμιοί ότι η Ελλάδα, αποσχισμένη από την Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία, στερημένη από τη ρωμέικη ορθόδοξη ταυτότητά της, κι εκμαυλισμένη λόγω εκδυτικισμού, πίστευε για δική της μια ‘ελληνοκεντρική’ ψευτοϊστορία τόσο ψεύτικη όσο και το κρατίδιο του Όθωνα.
Με τον επερχόμενο θάνατο και διάλυση των δημιουργών του ψευτοκράτους, θα σβύσουν και τα ρατσιστικά αποικιοκρατικά αφηγήματα για την τάχα σημασία του αρχαίου ελληνικού πολιτισμού, την δήθεν κοσμοϊστορική απήχησή του, και την υποτιθέμενη επίδρασή του σε άλλα έθνη.
Δηλαδή, κοντά είναι η μέρα που, αν κάποιοι κομπλεξικοί, υστερικοί και διεστραμμένοι σκατόψυχοι ισχυριστούν ότι υπήρχαν Έλληνες στην Αρχαία Κίνα, ότι η επαρχία Γιουν-νάν της Κίνας είναι ελληνική (επειδή οι Έλληνες λέγονται ‘Γιουνάν’ στα αραβικά!!!!!), κι ότι τα αγάλματα (από τερακότα) του κινεζικού στρατού στο Σιάν (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terracotta_Army) είναι φτειαγμένα από Έλληνες, θα τρώνε κι ένα σκεπάρνι στο κεφάλι για να ξεμπερδέψουμε μια και καλή από τους ψευτομασώνους της κακιάς ώρας.
Στην προώθηση κι εμπέδωση των μακρόπνοων σχεδίων της αφρο-ευρασιατικής επανασύνδεσης συμμετέχει με ιδιαίτερη έμφαση και η Ρωσσία, επειδή έχει καταλάβει ότι αυτή η εξέλιξη συμφέρει και στην Μόσχα.
Το Eastern Economic Forum-2019, το οποίο λαμβάνει χώρα σε λίγες μέρες στο Βλαδιβοστόκ, είναι μια κορυφαία εκδήλωση απ’ αυτή την άποψη.
Ως μείζον γεγονός φέρνει μαζί αρχηγούς κρατών, υπουργούς, βουλευτές, διευθυντές κρατικών οργανισμών, εκπροσώπους της ιδιωτικής πρωτοβουλίας και του επιχειρηματικού κόσμου, πανεπιστημιακούς, ειδικευμένους επιστήμονες, και δημοσιογράφους οι οποίοι εξετάζουν δυνατότητες και παρουσιάζουν προτάσεις για την υλοποίηση του φιλόδοξου προγράμματος των Νέων Δρόμων του Μεταξιού.
Είναι μια κοσμογονία που στην Ελλάδα δυστυχώς θα μείνει ολότελα άγνωστη και δεν θα καλυφθεί από τα διαπλεκόμενα ΜΜΕ και τα social media των κρετίνων αρχαιολατρών κι ελληνο-αυνανιστών.
Παράλληλα και εντός των πλαισίων της οργάνωσης του Eastern Economic Forum-2019, κορυφαία think tanks οργανώνουν ιδιαίτερα σεμινάρια και συζητήσεις που φωτίζουν όψεις της αφρο-ευρασιατικής αναγέννησης.
Στην συνέχεια θα βρείτε μια σειρά από παρουσιάσεις εκ μέρους του ρωσσικού think tank Valdai Club το οποίο συμμετέχει επίσης στο γεγονός.
Στο τέλος, σύνδεσμοι σας παραπέμπουν στο σάιτ του Eastern Economic Forum. Επίσης επισυνάπτω μια έκδοση του Valdai Club για το Μέλλον του Πολέμου (The Future of War) για να δείτε πόσο διαφορετική μορφή θα έχουν οι αυριανοί πόλεμοι: κανένας στρατός δεν θα μπορεί να τους αντιμετωπίσει και μόνον οι επί τούτω οργανωμένες ιδιωτικές στρατιωτικές εταιρείες θα είναι ικανές να τους διεξαγάγουν επιτυχώς.
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Valdai Club at the Eastern Economic Forum-2019
This year, the Valdai Club will take part in the Eastern Economic Forum for a fourth time. On September 4, at 10:00 the Club will hold a session titled “The Asian Mirror: The Pivot to the East Through the Eyes of our Asian Partners” and on the same day, at 14:30, it is due to present a book titled “Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East”.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/own/valdai-club-at-the-eastern-economic-forum-2019/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
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Valdai Club at the EEF-2019: The Asian Mirror: The Pivot to the East Through the Eyes of Our Asian Partners. Special Session
This year, the Valdai Discussion Club will take part in the Eastern Economic Forum for the fourth time. On September 4, at 10:00 the Club will hold a session titled “The Asian Mirror: The Pivot East Through the Eyes of Our Asian Partners”.
Logically and thematically, the session is a continuation of a series of events dedicated to the key focus of the Club’s work in 2019 – Russian politics in the East.
Our interest in the topic is due to the strengthening of Russia’s position in the East, the ambition of the country’s leaders to enhance the Eastern aspect of foreign policy, and the geopolitical events in the region, which have had an effect on the entire world.
The Valdai session’s main goal won’t be to discuss plans for the development of the Far East and its integration in the Asia-Pacific Region, but rather the things that have already been achieved. Russia’s turn to the East is gaining momentum.
The time has come to summarise its interim results and to hear the position of our Asian partners on how successful Russian policy has been, from their point of view.
The session will feature prominent experts and public opinion leaders from Russia and several Asian countries.
Together, they will answer: how do they regard the results of Russia’s turn to the East? What has it managed to do? What role does Asia want Russia to play?
Speakers:
To Anh Dung, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam
Fan Weiguo, Chief of Eurasian Bureau of Xinhua News Agency
Lee Jae-Young, President, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Michael Tay, Founder and Director of the Foundation for the Arts and Social Enterprise, Ambassador of Singapore to Russia (2002-2008); Founder of the Russia-Singapore Business Forum
Andrey Bystritskiy, Chairman of the Board of the Foundation for the Development and Support of the International Valdai Discussion Club
Apurva Sanghi, Lead Economist, World Bank in Russia
Moderator:
Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE
Working languages: Russian, English.
Venue: Vladivostok, Far Eastern Federal University, Building B, Conference Hall 6.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/announcements/valdai-club-at-the-eef-2019-the-asian-mirror-the-pivot-to-the-east/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
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Valdai Club at the EEF-2019: Presentation of a Book ‘Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East’
On September 4, at 14:30, in the framework of Eastern Economic Forum-2019, the Valdai Discussion Club is going to present a book titled “Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East”.
For years, the Valdai Discussion Club has been Russia’s leading analytical centre for discussing and developing the agenda for Russia’s turn to the East. Since 2013, when Russia’s leaders proclaimed that the development of the Far East is “a national task for the 21st century”, this project has become the most important engine of the country’s foreign and domestic policy.
Since 2012, the Club has published six analytic papers under the general title “Toward the Great Ocean”, which refers to the credo used by Russian pioneers from the 16th century until the early 20th century. The papers aim to both summarise the achievements and challenges of Russia’s turn to the East, and make suggestions for its development.
“Toward the Great Ocean: A Chronicle of Russia’s Turn to the East” is a collection of all the six analytic papers (2012–2018), as well as detailed comments by project manager Sergei Karaganov on each of its parts, as well as essays on the topic, delivered by prominent Asian scholars.
During the presentation of the book, attendees will also learn about the research work carried out by the Valdai Club and its plans for future publications.
Speakers:
Timofei Bordachev, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE
Andrey Bystritskiy, Chairman of the Board of the Foundation for the Development and Support of the International Valdai Discussion Club
Sergei Karaganov, Dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University Higher School of Economics; Honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy
Thomas Graham, Senior Director, Kissinger Associates
Moderator:
Victoria Panova, Vice-President for International Affairs, Far Eastern Federal University
Working languages: Russian, English.
Venue: Vladivostok, Far Eastern Federal University, Roscongress & Governors ’Club, Building A, Level 4.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/announcements/valdai-club-at-eef-2019-presentation-of-a-book-toward-the-great-ocean/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
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The Indo-Pacific Concept First Hand: Indian Foreign Minister Speaks at Valdai Club
On Tuesday, August 27, Indian Minister of External Affairs Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met with the Valdai Discussion Club’s experts. During the open part of the meeting, he spoke about the concept of the Indo-Pacific, as New Delhi sees it, about the key trends in modern international relations and the prospects for bilateral cooperation.
The day before, Mr. Jaishankar had arrived in Russia on his first visit as Minister of External Affairs in preparation for the Eastern Economic Forum, whose main foreign guest will be Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It is worth noting that the professional career of Subrahmanyam Jaishankar took him to Moscow almost forty years ago: for two years he worked at the Embassy of India as the third, and then the second secretary. At the beginning of the meeting at the Valdai Club, the Minister optimistically said that much has changed in the world over the years, but the Russian-Indian relations remain one of the stable factors in international life.
According to the minister, the most important trend in international relations is a movement towards multi-polarity. This is due to the weakening of US dominance, established after the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of new centres of power. “We believe that economic, political and technological power is more distributed around the world than ever before in history after 1945,” he said.
“Now there are more sources of influence in the world order, and the idea that one country can play a decisive role is out-dated.” This process is accompanied by the weakening of established rules and the growth of uncertainty. According to Mr. Jaishankar, the world goes from a system of alliances to a system of convergences, when countries join forces to solve common problems without entering into formal alliances.
As one example of such convergence, he named the concept of the Indo-Pacific region, which has become the hallmark of Indian foreign policy in recent years.
According to the minister, the connection between the regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans have existed for centuries: five hundred years ago, India’s cultural, political and economic presence was felt in Southeast Asia and on the coast of China, and the policy of the British, who made India the centre of their colonial empire in Asia, can be described as Indo-Pacific project.
Everything changed after the Second World War, when the United States, which became the hegemon in the region, shifted its focus to the Pacific Ocean and made Northeast Asia the centre of gravity. Mr. Jaishankar believes that the concept of the Indo-Pacific region has allowed for the restoration of the artificially-broken connection between the regions of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
The minister welcomed the fact, that the problems of the Indo-Pacific are beginning to be discussed more and more widely in Russia. According to him, it would be good if Russia formulates its own vision toward the Indo-Pacific region. “India is a strong power in the Indian Ocean with a serious interest in the Pacific Ocean, Russia is a strong Pacific power with an interest in the Indian Ocean,” he said.
‘How can we harmonize these interests – that’s the matter. We have such experience in the Eurasian space. It is important today to see where our interests in maritime cooperation can be translated into real interaction.”
Mr. Jaishankar emphasized that the concept of the Indo-Pacific is not directed against any countries, particularly China. According to him, the opinion that this concept is being promoted by Washington to contain Beijing’s influence is out-dated and reflects the Cold War paradigm. “India views the Indo-Pacific region in a more comprehensive manner,” he said.
Presentation of the Valdai Discussion Club’s Analytical Report “The Future of War”
On August 27, at 11.00, the Valdai Discussion Club hosted a presentation of Club’s new analytical report titled “The Future of War”.
http://valdaiclub.com/events/own/presentation-of-report-the-future-of-war/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
The Big Seven: The West Can No Longer Solve All Problems Alone
What is the “West”? Does the West still exist as such – in light of Britain’s exit from the EU and the US drift towards unilateral approaches? This question concerns many people now – mainly in Old Europe, writes Arnaud Dubien, head of the Observo Franco-Russian Analytical Centre.
Today, the G7 is going through difficult times – and even, perhaps, suffering a real existential crisis. This is due to at least two factors.
First, there is the presence in this club of an element that contrasts itself with the rest of the member countries – this, of course, is the United States. Since the US is the largest Western power, it has made the work of the organisation problematic: many experts say that on many issues it’s incorrect to think of the group as the G7, but rather “six plus one”.
Second, the weight and legitimacy of the Seven has been called into question, not only in connection with the absence or possible return of Russia to the group, but also because it is impossible to seriously discuss the fate of the world without China, India and other major world powers.
It would be more appropriate here to return to the idea of another French president – Giscard d’Estaing, who launched this project in the 1970s and saw what would become the “seven” as an informal conversation among Western democracies.
Now it better resembles something between the old “seven” and the current G20 with a joint agenda, which does not contribute to a better understanding of the group’s current tasks.
Even though, in order to avoid disagreements, the leaders of the G7 didn’t attempt to publish a joint communique, the benefits of the Biarritz summit were more than expected. Emmanuel Macron showed considerable energy and a lot of questions were brought up for discussion – these not only concerned the fate of the West, but also trade wars and Brazil’s fires.
As for Macron’s discussions about the future of the West and the role the G7, one can see here that the development of those thoughts surrounded his meeting with Vladimir Putin: the French president understands that the West can no longer solve all problems alone and that its influence is diminishing, although this does not need to be overestimated.
On the other hand, what is the “West”? Is there still the West as such – in light of Britain’s exit from the EU and the US drift towards unilateral approaches? This question is of concern to many now – mainly in Old Europe. If initially the European Union was created out of fear of the USSR, now it has to dissociate itself from the United States. If Europe, as Macron says, wants to be sovereign, it will have to assert itself and go against the ideas that have dominated for sixty years. Therefore, this process is becoming harder.
Whether negotiations with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif following his somewhat unexpected appearance at the summit have succeeded in influencing the fate of the JCPOA is not known, and one can only hope for that. However, in general, this once again shows that even within the G7, the United States has adopted an isolated stance on this issue.
Although this initiative originally belonged to Macron, it seems to have been supported by all other countries in Europe and even Japan. In other words, this is an attempt to show that Europe, at least on this issue, can assert its identity, take a unified position and force the United States to talk, and maybe even make concessions.
As for the question of Russia’s return, Moscow has little interest in re-creating the G8, because it never felt comfortable there; on the contrary, it often found itself alone against everyone else.
However, the very fact that this issue is being discussed, that new watersheds have appeared and frictions have arisen, is positive for Russia: this means that the topic is big and important for discussion in a club where Moscow does not represent itself.
This confirms Macron’s thesis that without Russia, serious global problems cannot be solved. For Moscow, at this stage, this is the most positive development.
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-west-can-no-longer-solve-all-problems/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
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G7 Summit in Biarritz: The End of Westernization
Biarritz was, if we must believe the French media, the centre of the world, on the occasion of the G7 summit this weekend (24th – 26th August). It was a summit that was dedicated, officially, to fighting inequality, but one where contentious topics were discussed: the GAFA tax, which had the unusual effect of uniting the French and the British against the Americans, the environment, the trade dispute between the United States and China, and the question of Iran, regarding which the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA agreement has been widely criticised among European countries.
But this G7 summit, despite communications operations – like the arrival, presented as a “surprise,” by the Iranian Foreign Minister – could well turn out to be a failure. The member countries have taken action so that national policies and bilateral relations now outweigh multilateralism. In addition, it should be added that we are no longer where we found ourselves during the 1980s or 1990s. The G7, which claims to be the “club” of the richest and most powerful countries, has today been overtaken by the BRICS. In fact, it is the G20 that is increasingly emerging as the legitimate institution for dealing with the interweaving of economic, financial and strategic affairs.
The G7, official and unofficial agenda
Officially, therefore, the expected decisions concerned the reduction of inequality, an important topic in a world torn apart by inequalities. However, it is a subject on which we can expect a lot of beautiful words and very little concrete action. The issue of the environment has taken some urgency because of the devastating forest fires ravaging the Amazon.
This is obviously an important question, but also an issue where there is a lot of hypocrisy. This is because the Amazon isn’t just burning in Brazil (fires have also ravaged Bolivia, Paraguay and other countries), and also because the Amazon is not the only major forest to burn: forest fires that today rage in Africa are equally important, but no one speaks of it.
Similarly, this summer’s fires, which are certainly disastrous, are only slightly more numerous than those of 2016: 75,336 fires versus 69,310. It is true that the problem of deforestation, induced by the pressure of livestock and the cultivation of soybeans, is a major issue today in the Amazon. But it was, perhaps, an even more pressing problem twenty years ago.
Source:
https://rainforests.mongabay.com/amazon/deforestation_calculations.html#content
The issue of trade negotiations and the role of multilateralism were also discussed. The United States and other countries differ on this point in important ways. We can also note that some issues which were not explicitly on the agenda were addressed: the instrumentalisation of trade in dollars for political purposes by the United States is a major problem, as well as the growing risks of recession and global crisis.
The United States has clearly expressed dissatisfaction with multilateral negotiations. The countries of the European Union are, rightly or wrongly, more attached to it. The membership of the United States in the WTO has therefore been called into question; it is indeed a central issue. If the US government were to decide to walk out of the WTO, it would probably sound the death toll for the organisation.
The question of Iran was also raised at the summit. The European countries have denounced the US decision to walk away from the agreement with Iran on nuclear weapons and technology. They have also denounced the US sanctions policy, which is hurting the European countries much more than Iran. The arrival of the Iranian Foreign Minister testifies to Emmanuel Macron’s willingness to restart negotiations at this point.
The challenges of this summit
Emmanuel Macron, who happens to be the President of the G7 this year, was playing a high-stakes game with this meeting. A clear failure, as in 2018 in Canada, would have lastingly compromised his claims to present himself as a great negotiator. He is also aware that the influence of the G7 has greatly diminished over the last ten years. The G7 is the distant heir of the G5, which was formed to try to coordinate the monetary policies of the major Western powers following the dissolution in 1973 of the Bretton Woods agreements.
Originally, the G7 was the brainchild of French President Giscard d’Estaing (1974-1981). The G7 has been tasked with coordinating currency movements as exchange rates have become flexible. Called first informally the G5, then provisionally the G6 when it was formally established in 1975, and later the G7 with Canada’s integration in 1976, its influence soon spread to other aspects of the economy, beyond mere monetary policy problems.
The G7 nations still had, at the end of the twentieth century, a dominant role in the world economy. This is no longer the case today. The process of the emergence of new economies has clearly changed the whole ball game. The expulsion of Russia from the G8 in 2014, an expulsion that is now regretted by both the Japanese and Italian leaders as well as Donald Trump, has certainly hastened its decline. Moreover, if we calculate in purchasing power parity terms, the G7’s share of global GDP is today lower than that of the BRICS, a forum which brings together five emerging market countries.
It is obvious that Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to invite other countries, such as Australia, India, South Africa and Chile, is a recognition of this state of affairs. However, it must be noted here that China and Russia were not invited, despite the major role they play. The invitations that were made were therefore intended to mask the G7’s loss of influence and prestige in comparison with the G20.
G7 or G20?
It is clear today that any closed club of rich countries no longer has any legitimacy making decisions on behalf of the emerging market countries or even just proposing them. The United States, for its part, has understood that it would like to re-invite Russia to participate in the G7, according to a statement mirroring one made by the Japanese prime minister. But it is unlikely that Russia would really be moved by such a proposal. It knows full well that the G7 is an institution that is nearing the end of its life. The G7 is thus being overtaken by the BRICS not only in terms of its percentage of world PPP-adjusted GDP, but also in terms of the proportion of investment being made worldwide.
This reflects not only the rise of investments being made in China, India and Russia, both internally and worldwide, but also the significant slowdown in investments made in the G7 countries, whether they be German or US investments. Again, it can be seen that until 2000, the G7 countries accounted for about 60% of global investment. The turning point therefore dates from the 21st century. Emerging market countries have significantly increased their share of investment. They caught up with the G7 countries in 2009, and they overtook them.
In fact, a comparison of the G20 with the G7 shows that the first group has taken precedence over the second. It is the G20 that has become the global forum that really counts. And this is true when you compare the weight of the G7 with that of the G20.
The G20 currently accounts for 73.6% of global GDP. The group is comprised of the G7 nations, the European Union, the BRICS and six other countries. It is this set of countries (along with the EU) that is most economically relevant.
What are final results of this summit?
The record that we can draw today from this summit is very mixed. Clearly, we have not gone beyond rhetoric in addressing the question of inequality or the environmental emergency. It could not have been otherwise, given the significant differences among the G7 countries.
The trade dispute between China and the United States, meanwhile, is more beautiful. On Friday, August 23rd, China re-launched the escalation of the trade war, with further tariff increases on products imported from the United States. The US administration immediately responded by increasing duties on products imported from China.
All this has been observed, by the European G7 countries, which have not reacted. Germany, in particular, fears being dragged into this trade war, as its economy is on the verge of a recession. Regarding the GAFA tax, which both the French and British governments are pushing for, an agreement could possibly be reached, but at the probable price of making a mockery of the very idea of taxing Internet giants.
With respect to the Iranian issue, it is clear that the discussions will continue. Both the United States and Iran want to find a way out of the current crisis. It is perhaps on this issue that progress is possible.
However, this summit has rammed home an important lesson. So we are witnessing the end of the Westernisation of the world, a process that took place between the late eighteenth century and the end of the twentieth century. We must make note of this. It is why Russia does not particularly want to return to the G7, even though it has been pleased to hear Donald Trump’s statements about its possible return.
The centre of gravity of the global economy is indeed no longer the Atlantic Ocean. It has moved to Asia with the rise of China, the world’s second largest economy (and even first if we calculate in Purchasing Power Parity terms) and a direct interlocutor of the United States. And this is not to mention India, which is also gaining strength and is now in 5th place, ahead of France. This is why the meeting of the G7 in Biarritz was no longer able to decide for the world, whatever the major French media and its journalists think.
The G7 countries, since the summit held in Canada in 2018, have measured what it would be like to show off their differences. At the same time, never have the latter been so important, and above all, seemed irremediable and irreconcilable. So, we cannot exclude the notion that the group is witnessing open failure. However, it is more likely that diplomats will find some beautiful hollow formulas that proclaim that the “club” still works even though it is patently acknowledged that the group is paralyzed and, above all, that it no longer has the importance it had 20 years ago.
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/g7-summit/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=137&utm_medium=email
Goodbye Pacific Rim, Hello Indo-Pacific?
THE EASTERN PERSPECTIVE
01.07.2019
By Anton Bespalov
In recent years, the term “Indo-Pacific” has been used more and more frequently. According to some analysts, it is replacing the well-established concept of the Asia-Pacific region, reflecting a new balance of power in Asia. Beijing is suspicious of the fact that the Indo-Pacific concept is being actively promoted by Washington, believing that its ultimate goal is to contain China.
We are investigating whether or not this is so – and whether Russia should be wary of the emergence of a new regional construct.
“Indo-Pacific” appeared for the first time as a geostrategic concept in a January 2007 article by analyst Gurprit Khurana for the magazine Strategic Analysis. The author, an Indian naval captain, postulates that for India, the safety of sea routes has become more and more important, since almost all of its foreign trade, including the import of energy resources, is by sea. Japan is in a similar situation – and therefore, in his opinion, the interests of the two countries will increasingly converge, which will lead to the creation of a special political and economic community uniting the two oceans.
The Indo-Pacific notion immediately gained recognition in India – if only because the concept of “Asia-Pacific” categorically did not suit Indians. In a publication dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the article “Safety of sea routes: prospects for Indian-Japanese cooperation,” Khurana quoted the former chief of staff of the Indian Navy, Aruna Prakash, who, speaking in 2009 at the Shangri-La Dialogue forum, said:
Every time I hear about the Asia-Pacific region, it seems to me, as an Indian, that my country is left out of the box. This region seems to include northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, and ends at the Strait of Malacca. But the whole world begins west of the Strait of Malacca.
The new term appeared at an opportune time: India was becoming increasingly aware of itself as an independent actor in the global arena, which was reflected in the national consciousness. As for Japan, at the beginning of the 21st century, it was already headed for rapprochement with India. Also in 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke about the special role of the two countries in Asia in an address to the Indian parliament.
He called for the creation of an “arc of freedom and well-being” along the outer rim of the Eurasian continent. The Indo-Japanese partnership, according to Abe, should be built on “common values, such as freedom, democracy and respect for fundamental human rights, as well as strategic interests”.
The Japanese prime minister painted a grand picture – through their joint efforts, the two countries would create a new “open and transparent” community of freedom and democracy that will unite the entire Pacific region, including the United States and Australia, and ensure the free movement of people, goods, capital and knowledge.
“CONFLUENCE OF THE TWO SEAS” SPEECH BY H.E.MR. SHINZO ABE, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN AT THE PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA
By Japan and India coming together in this way, this “broader Asia” will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia. Open and transparent, this network will allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely.
The word “China” was not heard in Abe’s speech even once, but both parties understood each other perfectly. The “arc of freedom” neatly bypasses the PRC, and the Asian giant remains outside the brackets of the “wide open Asia” that the Japanese prime minister spoke of.
During his second term in office, Abe perfected this concept, making Indo-Pacific a central theme of Japan’s security policy, economic aid and investment, writes Robert Manning, author of the Valdai Paper “United States Indo-Pacific Strategy: Myths and Reality.”
In a 2016 speech, Abe defined this concept, explaining that “the goal of this strategy is to turn the Indo-Pacific region into a zone free from violence and coercion, where the rule of law reigns and where the market economy rules, ensuring regional prosperity”. The three main pillars, according to Tokyo, are: values and principles – democracy, the rule of law, free markets and the improvement of physical and institutional connectedness; safety and stability; and ensuring freedom of navigation.
Another country where the new concept was adopted with enthusiasm was Australia, which is logical, given that the country is actually washed by the waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, despite being on the periphery of the newly-imagined region.
For more than a decade, the economic development of the country has relied on trade with China, and in recent years Australian policymakers have been increasingly talking about the influence of Beijing on the nation’s domestic policy. Becoming overly dependent on “undemocratic” and “unfree” China is the main nightmare of the elites of one of the most “Western” countries in the southern hemisphere..
In 2013, the country’s White Paper on Defence noted: “The continuing rise of China as a global power, the growing economic and strategic weight of East Asia, and India’s imminent transformation into a global power are all key trends affecting the development of the Indian Ocean region as being of heightened strategic importance. Taken together, these trends contribute to the formation of the Indo-Pacific region as a single strategic arc.”
As for the United States, the first mention of the Indo-Pacific by their officials was in 2010. “We understand how important the Indo-Pacific basin is for global trade,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, emphasising the importance of the interaction between the US Navy and India in the Pacific. At long last, “Indo-Pacific” entered the American foreign policy lexicon with Donald Trump.
It was during his presidency that the format of the quadrilateral security dialogue (QUAD), proposed by Shinzo Abe back in 2007, was revived. In November 2017, Trump took part in two important East Asian forums over the course of several days: the APEC summit in Da Nang, Vietnam and the ASEAN summit in Manila, Philippines.
As Valdai Club expert Viktor Sumsky wrote, in public statements, Trump made no mention of the Pacific Rim, a key feature of APEC rhetoric, speaking instead about the Indo-Pacific region. A working meeting among the diplomats of four countries on the sidelines of the East Asian Summit caused a wave of publications about the formation of a new security configuration in the region – directed against China.
It must be said that Beijing perceived the very first consultations in the quadrilateral format as being directed against China, and reacted with lightning speed. On the eve of the meeting, the representatives of Australia, India, the US and Japan in Manila on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in May 2007, China sent a note to each of the four countries. Beijing’s attitude toward the Indo-Pacific concept was and remains negative, and is characterised by Valdai club expert Zhao Huasheng as one of “coldness and suspicion.”
But can it really be considered anti-Chinese? To what extent are the QUAD members attempting to contain China or confront it? Looking ahead, let’s say: no one wants confrontation, but there are nuances.
The idea of the Indo-Pacific has an anti-Chinese sound only as interpreted by Washington, says Valdai Club expert Alexei Kupriyanov, a researcher at IMEMO RAN. “In the US interpretation, the Indo-Pacific is structured around the QUAD as a prototype of a defensive alliance that operates in the most acceptable form to other participating states – without commitments and exclusively through informal consultations,” he says. “The United States wants to demonstrate its interest in this project without extra spending and commitment, by trying to establish an anti-China alliance with the participation of India and Australia.”
In turn, India seeks to maximize the use of Americans as a counterweight to China, the expert said. Delhi does not want to get too close to Washington and commit itself – and at the same time wants to increase its economic and political ties with Japan. “India is trying to maintain a balance between the US and China,” says Kupriyanov. “Although India’s political and military leaders are emphatically anti-China, its economic interests require cooperation with China. Although India bluntly rejects the idea of becoming China’s junior partner, it does not intend to take part in any anti-Chinese actions outside the Indian Ocean. ”
Japan is in a similar situation. According to Kupriyanov, it has to simultaneously cooperate and compete with China. “In addition, Japan is interested in access to the promising markets of the African countries and preserving its positions in Southeast and South Asia.
In August 2018, Indonesia announced its own vision of Indo-Pacific, and this was an interesting turn in the development of the concept. “ The importance of this step is hard to overestimate,” writes Kupriyanov. “For a decade, the ASEAN states denied the Indo-Pacific region the right to exist, fearing that the new geopolitical construct would destroy the familiar, well-known Asia-Pacific region, in which ASEAN had already staked out a key role.
The decision of Indonesia, which claims to be the unofficial leader of the Association, to abandon this practice and henceforth build its policy within an Indo-Pacific framework means that one of the most serious opponents of the Indo-Pacific construct has moved to the camp of its supporters, and others will follow. ”
This step was quite logical, since it is Indonesia that serves as a link between the Indian and Pacific oceans. It is noteworthy that its vision of the Indo-Pacific region has no anti-Chinese overtones. As can be seen, the US desire to create an alliance against Beijing contradicts the objective interests of other countries of the region being created. They not only do not want confrontation with China, but also realize that trade and economic ties with the Asian giant are the key to their successful development.
However, Washington is aware of the reluctance of Asian countries to enter direct confrontation with China. Therefore, the system of restraining China’s regional ambitions will be “elegant and subtle”, rather than taking the form of a defensive alliance, wrote Valdai club expert Anton Tsvetov in March 2018. Despite the continuing statements about shared values, the nature of the union, the backbone of which will remain the QUAD, will be pragmatic.
This is quite natural, given that a number of states that are concerned about the strengthening of China do not fall into the category of “free” and “democratic” at all. We are talking primarily about Vietnam, which is actively developing relations with the United States and with India, despite the differences in political systems. This transition to pragmatism is reflected in the fact that the Indo-Pacific region is less and less often categorized in terms of “maritime democracies”, notes Tsvetov: “instead of this phrase, the expression ‘like-minded states’ is used.”
It is interesting to look at how countries from this still largely imaginary region look at Chinese infrastructure projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In Asia, this initiative is perceived ambiguously: both as a chance for development, and as a means of promoting Beijing’s influence.
In February 2018, the QUAD member countries first addressed the creation of alternatives to the Chinese initiative, and the development of “quality infrastructure” was among the themes during the Japanese presidency of the G20.
The term “quality”, as you might guess, means infrastructure created not under the leadership of China or with Chinese money. So far, the results have been rather modest, but this does not mean that in the future the two projects will not be able to compete, for the benefit of the countries which receive infrastructure assistance.
“Currently, the BRI and the ‘free and open’ Indo-Pacific region are competing initiatives,” says Samir Saran, President of the Indian Observer Analytical Centre Research Foundation. However, the real choice will be made by developing states, who are currently leveraging both initiatives to obtain better deals.
It’s not inconceivable that in the long term, some multilateral arrangement will accommodate both initiatives. The ‘viability’ of these competing propositions will depend on which resonates more with the development and security needs of developing states in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific. In the short term, both will co-exist and compete.”
Japan, despite being one of the key countries interested in creating an alternative to the Belt and Road, is “inclined to cooperate with China on the BRI to advance its own commercial interests,” adds Saran. As for India, it does not plan to participate in the BRI, believing that this project undermines its sovereignty and makes it difficult to defend interests in other areas. “On the other hand, China can become the largest investor in the economy of India. Delhi will have to pursue a steadfast course in foreign policy and develop economic cooperation with China,” the expert emphasises.
The Indo-Pacific project is only considered by Washington as a zero-sum game, says Alexei Kupriyanov: “For the US, freezing or liquidating all Chinese infrastructure and trade initiatives is beneficial, as it undermines China’s economic and political opportunities, destroys its safe rear, and forces resources and funds to be removed from the main, from the American point of view, theatre – the Pacific Ocean.”
For the rest of Asia, Indo-Pacific offers an alternative to the land projects of the Belt and Road. “It is quicker and easier to transport some goods by land and others by sea. If there is a problem with one, the other could compensate. The Indo-Japanese-Indonesian version of the Indo-Pacific and the Belt and Road project could be integrated if both sides are interested and have the political will: both initiatives increase Eurasia’s transport potential.”
That is why Russia should closely monitor the implementation of the Indo-Pacific concept, seeing in it not as a threat, but a chance for itself. “Russia should support the Indo-Japanese-Indonesian view of the Indo-Pacific as a maritime Eurasia to counterweigh the US concept of it as a space for an anti-China alliance. It is necessary to uphold the inclusive character of the Indo-Pacific (probably including renaming the concept the Indo-Asia-Pacific) and to facilitate China’s involvement in it,” Kupriyanov says.
“The Indo-Pacific project gives Moscow leverage with China in Eurasia,” believes Samir Saran, reflecting India’s traditional concern about the close ties between Moscow and Beijing. “Currently, Russia is subservient to China’s economy and, by consequence, its political vision. Moscow should recognize that while China may seek a multipolar world, its vision for Eurasia is unipolar. Russia will only benefit if both the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia are truly multipolar in their power structures.”
In this regard, questions arise regarding the quality of Russia’s relations with India and the ASEAN countries, as key participants in the region being created. This topic was discussed during two important events held by the Valdai Club in 2019: the Russia-India and Russia-Vietnam conferences. The participants have stated that there is a “demand for Russia” both in India and in Southeast Asia, but Russia’s ability to increase its economic and political presence in the region is limited. Moreover, the existing bias towards military technology cooperation (especially in relations with India) may result in the loss of strategic positions in the long run.
Therefore, it is time for Russia to form its own vision of Indo-Pacific and, importantly, bring it to the countries of the region. “A provision to the effect that Russia’s regions in the Far East (Primorye Territory and Kamchatka) are an inalienable part of the Indo-Pacific should play a key role in this respect,” Kupriyanov says.
“These regions should be viewed as gates to the north that can provide access to the wealth of northern Eurasia and the joining of great Eurasian overland routes with the sea routes along its southern coast. They should also be seen as gates to the Arctic, a storehouse of resources. The Far East should be positioned as one of the centers of attraction in the Indo-Pacific, its resource, scientific and, in perspective, also its production base.”
Thus, connecting to the Indo-Pacific project could provide for Russia an addition to its large-scale turn to the East. By providing an alternative to the main sea trade route of Eurasia, Indo-Pacific also fit into the logic of building a Greater Eurasia, as Moscow advocates. Washington’s attempts to “encircle” China run up against the resistance of regional powers that do not want confrontation with Beijing, as well as excessive US influence in Asia. The geostrategic landscape is changing rapidly, and the main thing for Russia is to keep up with these changes, taking advantage of opportunities as they arise.
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/goodbye-pacific-rim-hello-indo-pacific/
Σχετικά με το Eastern Economic Forum-2019, 4-6 Σεπτεμβρίου 2019:
https://forumvostok.ru/en/about-the-forum/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/cultural/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/organizing-committee-reception/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/combat-night/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/sport-programme/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/social-platform/
https://forumvostok.ru/en/programme/partner-events/
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Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250591302
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/afro-eurasiatic_geopolitics_30_8_2019.docx
https://vk.com/doc429864789_619665631
Η Ζωή στο Λορεστάν και οι Λορί του Μέσου Ζάγρου, της Οροσειράς που χωρίζει Ιράκ και Ιράν
Life in Luristan, and the Luris of Middle Zagros, the Mountains that separate Iraq and Iran
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 26 Αυγούστου 2019.
Αναπαράγοντας στοιχεία από ομιλία μου στο Καζακστάν τον Ιανουάριο του 2019, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης αποδεικνύει με το εκλαϊκευτικό κείμενό του αυτό ότι, αρκεί να παρουσιάσει αντικειμενικά και συστηματικά κάποιος τους κατά τόπους λαούς και έθνη του Ζάγρου, του Αντιταύρου, της βόρειας Μεσοποταμίας και της ανατολικής Ανατολίας (Doğu Anadolu), για να αποδείξει αυτόματα ότι δεν υπάρχουν "Κούρδοι" αλλά πολλά και μεταξύ τους πολύ διαφορετικά έθνη, τα οποία παρουσιάζονται διεθνώς ως δήθεν ένα - μόνον από τους άθλιους πολιτικούς και ακαδημαϊκούς γκάνγκστερς των αποικιοκρατικών χωρών (Γαλλία, Αγγλία, ΗΠΑ, Καναδάς, Αυστραλία, Ολλανδία, Ισραήλ) και τα κατά τόπους όργανά τους, με σκοπό την δημιουργία ενός ψευδοκράτους μέσα στο οποίο τα διαφορετικά μεταξύ τους αυτά έθνη θα σφάζονται εσαεί και μάλιστα χειρότερα από οπουδήποτε αλλού.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/08/26/η-ζωή-στο-λορεστάν-και-οι-λορί-του-μέσου/ ============
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Μια περιοχή που αξίζει να περιηγηθείτε από χωριό σε χωριό για ένα μήνα τουλάχιστον και να γνωρίσετε από κοντά τα ήθη και τα έθιμα, τις παραδόσεις και τις δοξασίες των γηγενών Λορί είναι το Λορεστάν, μια ορεινή επαρχία του δυτικού Ιράν σχεδόν πάνω στα σύνορα με το Ιράκ.
Στα λαγκάδια θα είστε στα 700-1200 μ και οι βουνοκορφές τριγύρω θα ξεπερνούν τα 2500-3500 μ.
Οι Λορί είναι ένα αρχαίο ιρανικό φύλο που διατήρησε πάντοτε την ιδιαιτερότητά του και την ταυτότητά του μέσα στο Ιράν, ζώντας κοντά στους Λακί και στους Μπαχτιαρί (ακόμη πιο νοτιοανατολικά στον Ζάγρο), στους Πέρσες (στα νότια τμήματα του ιρανικού οροπεδίου), στους Φαΐλι και στους Γκοράνι (πιο βόρεια στον Ζάγρο), στους Αζέρους (στα βόρεια-βορειοδυτικά τμήματα του ιρανικού οροπεδίου), στους Τουρκμένους και στα άλλα έθνη του Ιράν.
Κατοίκηση στα σημεία αυτά πάει πολύ παλιά λόγω της σχετικής εγγύτητας με την Μεσοποταμία, όπου ξεκίνησε ο ανθρώπινος πολιτισμός.
Με το που κατεβεί κάποιος από τα βουνά προς την πεδιάδα στα δυτικά βρίσκεται στην Κεντρική Μεσοποταμία. Τα χάλκινα αγάλματα του Λορεστάν (πρώτο μισό της πρώτης προχριστιανικής χιλιετίας) αποτελούν κεντρικό κεφάλαιο της Προϊστορίας της ευρύτερης περιοχής.
Οι Λορί (ή και Λουρί) είναι στην πλειοψηφία τους σιίτες μουσουλμάνοι αλλά στο Λορεστάν (ή και Λουριστάν) υπάρχουν και πιστοί άλλων θρησκειών, όπως οι Γιαρσανί (επίσης γνωστοί και ως Αχλ-ε Χακ), μια από τις πολλές θρησκείες του ευρύτερου χώρου ανάμεσα στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο και την Κεντρική Ασία που είναι άγνωστες στον περισσότερο κόσμο.
Οι Λορί έχουν τρομερή προσήλωση στις παραδόσεις τους και ακόμη και ανάμεσα στους σιίτες Λορί κυριαρχούν προϊσλαμικές δοξασίες που δημιουργούν συχνά-πυκνά πρόβλημα στις άτεγκτες κι αλύγιστες ηγεσίες των θρησκευτικών ηγετών του Ιράν.
Δεν κάνω λόγο για την Ισλαμική Δημοκρατία που εγκαινιάστηκε το 1979 με την αποχώρηση του ψευτο-σάχη και την επιστροφή του Χομεϊνί.
Ήδη στις αρχές του 19ου αιώνα, στα χρόνια δηλαδή της τουρκμενικής δυναστείας Κατζάρ του Ιράν, οι Λορί είχαν τόσο απομακρυνθεί από την σιιτική ισλαμική ορθοδοξία που οι ιρανικές αρχές ζήτησαν από τους Οθωμανούς να στείλουν από την Κερμπαλά της Νότιας Μεσοποταμίας (καίριο σιιτικό ιερό) ένα θεολόγο για να …. κηρύξει το (σιιτικό) Ισλάμ στους Λορί!!!
Χορός ντασμάλ-μπαζί στο Μαμασανί
Η ζωή των Λορί είναι ταυτισμένη με τον ετήσιο κύκλο και συνυφασμένη με την εναλλαγή των εποχών: οι γεωργικές και κτηνοτροφικές απασχολήσεις τηρούνται κατά τον πατροπαράδοτο τρόπο και κανένας νεωτερισμός δεν μπαίνει στα χωριά των Λορί όπου ο παγερός χειμώνας σημαίνει ζωή γύρω από την εστία, αφηγήσεις παραμυθιών για τα παιδιά, και για τους μεγαλύτερους διάβασμα του Κορανίου (ή διάβασμα του Καλάμ-ε Σαραν-ντζάν / کلام سرانجام για τους Γιαρσανί).
Οι Λορί δεν έχουν καμμιά διάθεση για να αποσχισθούν ή να σχηματίσουν ένα ανεξάρτητο κράτος παρά τις επίμονες προσπάθειες της ΣΙΑ, της Μοσάντ του Ισραήλ και άλλων μυστικών υπηρεσιών να τους πείσουν ότι είναι ‘Κούρδοι’ και ότι πρέπει να έχουν ‘το δικό τους κράτος’.
Ούτε οι Λορί, ούτε οι Λακί, ούτε οι Γιαρσανί, ούτε οι Γκοράνι δέχονται το ψεύτικο παραμύθι των ‘Κούρδων’, ενός ψευτο-έθνους παρασκευασμένου από μυστικές υπηρεσίες χωρών που μισούν την ευρύτερη περιοχή και θέλουν να την βουλιάξουν σε ατελείωτους πολέμους.
Πως οι Λορί καταλαβαίνουν ότι δεν πρέπει να πιστέψουν τα λόγια των άθλιων τεράτων του Ισραήλ, των ΗΠΑ, της Αγγλίας και της Γαλλίας;
Πως οι Λορί θυμούνται ότι στα αραβικά η λέξη Ακράντ στον πληθυντικό (: ‘Κούρδοι’) δεν σημαίνει ένα συγκεκριμένο έθνος αλλά πολλά και διαφορετικά έθνη που κατοικούν στα βουνά (‘Τζεμπάλ’);
Γιατί οι Σοράνι της Σουλεϋμανίγιε (στο Ιράκ) και οι Κουρμάντζι του Ντιγιάρμπακιρ (στην Τουρκία) ξέχασαν τις αλήθειες που ξέρουν, κατανοούν και τηρούν ακόμη οι Λορί, κι έτσι οι ηγεσίες τους ξεπουλήθηκαν στους εγκληματίες σατανιστές της Δύσης;
Η απάντηση σε όλα αυτά τα ερωτήματα είναι μία και απλή. Δεν έχει να κάνει με την πολιτική, γιατί πολιτική δεν υπάρχει: είναι ένα ψέμμα που οι προπαγανδιστές του εμφανίζουν ως τάχα πραγματικό, ενώ στην πραγματικότητα αυτό που αποκαλείται ‘πολιτική’ είναι η υλοποίηση μιας πρότερον ανύπαρκτης διαστροφής που την υλοποιούν μόνον τα θύματά της, δηλαδή οι ανεγκέφαλοι που αποδέχονται το ψέμμα.
Στο Λορεστάν δεν υπάρχει καμμιά πολιτική κι οι Λορί δεν θέλουν καμμιά πολιτική.
Ποια είναι η απάντηση;
Η ζωή στο χωριό και κοντά στην φύση, χωρίς τον σύγχρονο ανθρωποκτονικό ‘τεχνολογικό πολιτισμό’ είναι υγεία για το σώμα και το μυαλό.
Οπότε, οι χωρικοί κι οι αγρότες του Λορεστάν, επειδή είναι υγιείς, αντιλαμβάνονται τι είναι αλήθεια και τι είναι ψέμμα πολύ πιο εύκολα από ένα άρρωστο, σάπιο κάτοικο μεγαλουπόλεων.
Το πιθανώτερο να σας συμβεί, αν ζείτε σε μια μεγαλούπολη, είναι να πιστέψετε τα ψέμματα που σας λένε και να δείτε τον κόσμο και την ζωή πολύ στραβά, την Ιστορία ανάποδα και με ρατσιστικούς φακούς, και την καθημερινότητα ως την ‘ζωή εν τάφω’ που ζείτε εκεί.
Τα δηλητήρια που τρώτε και πίνετε στις μεγαλουπόλεις, ο μολυσμένος αέρας που αναπνέετε, κι η αποκοπή σας από την φύση αποτελούν πιστοποιητικό αποβλάκωσης και προσαρμογής στα ψέμματα που σας λένε όλοι εκεί.
Αν θα πηγαίνατε να ζήσετε στο Λορεστάν, θα ήταν ο πιο άφθαστος Παράδεισος για σας.
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Лурестан, Луры и их традиционная музыка – Luristan, Luris and their Traditional Music
https://www.ok.ru/video/1488355527277
Лурестан, Луры, их музыка и повседневная жизнь
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240280
Luristan, Luris and their Traditional Music – Λορεστάν, οι Λορί και η Παραδοσιακή Μουσική τους
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Αρχαιότητες του πρώτου μισού της πρώτης προχριστιανικής χιλιετίας από το Λορεστάν
Οι χρυσές προσωπίδες του Σπηλαίου Καλμακαρέχ, όχι μακριά από την πόλη Πολ-ε Ντοχτάρ, στο Λορεστάν
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Διαβάστε:
Luristan
v. Religion, Rituals, and Popular Beliefs
The official religion
Since the accession of the first Safavid shah (1502), the official religion in Iran has been the Eṯnā-ʿašariya (Twelver) Shiʿism, one of the two main branches of Islam. A noteworthy point in this context is that the Lur society has been living within the framework of Islam, but under conditions and circumstances that encouraged rather than restricted a free display of popular traditions, such as the cult of local shrines, emāmzādas (descendants of the Shiʿite imams), and other sects, especially the Ahl-e Ḥaqq, as well as many aspects of supernaturalism.
In areas where people did not speak or understand Arabic, or were mostly illiterate, as among the nomads of Luristan, the declaration of faith and especially performance of different prayers, were bound to take on a much more ritualistic value. Here, the need for oral interpretation and explanation of the orthodox faith was necessary if a completely unrestricted and free display of the popular beliefs and customs were to be avoided.
Thus, at the beginning of the 19th century during the governorship of Prince Moḥammad-ʿAli Mirzā, the Lurs had gone so far astray from the orthodox path that a preacher of the higher religious classes, a mojtahed, was brought in from Karbala in order to “convert” the tribes back to Islam (cf. Rabino, p. 24; Minorsky, 1978, p. 823).
It is uncertain to what degree this attempt was successful, but it is known that there was not normally any direct, authoritative, and powerful institution which could secure and defend the official and orthodox faith and conceptions in Luristan.
Almost all the writers who have dealt with this theme, except Cecil John Edmonds (1922, p. 341), are unanimous in the view that the Lurs, although outwardly professing Islam, have had only a faint idea of the orthodox religion and to a large degree have been indifferent to the Islamic doctrines, while at the same time they have indulged in superstitious rites and have deep veneration for local pirs (spiritual masters) and prophets.
Consequently, it is difficult to describe the impact of religion on the nomadic society of Luristan, where religious notions had become an integral part of life to such an extent that life itself, especially the modus vivendi of the nomads, was one big, yearly, revolving ritual, spaced by recurring seasons, migrations, births, festivals, and deaths.
What a spectator might want to call the “religious” aspects had simply ceased to be perceived as anything separate or to hold any aspect of apartness for the nomads, a circumstance, which also means that any specific questions about “religion” are poorly understood, because religion in Luristan was an unconsciously integrated part of the cycle of life (Demant Mortensen, 2010, p. 12 ff.).
Ahl-e Ḥaqq
Although most Lurs officially adhere to Twelver Shiʿism, with a sprinkling of Sunni Muslims, some adherents of the Ahl-e Ḥaqq (People of the [absolute] Truth) sect are found among the Lur and the Kurdish populations. Ahl-e Ḥaqq are often referred to in the literature as ʿAli-Elāhi or ʿAli-Allāhi (Minorsky, 1964, p. 306) and as having their roots in the heartland of Luristan.
There has been no central, uniform organization and no canonical scripture among the Ahl-e Ḥaqq, which has been traced within numerous tribal, ethnic, religious, and social groups. The cradle of the sect is definitely the area occupied by the Gurānis, which is now divided between the Iraqi and the Iranian Kurdistan, and also including some tribes of northern Luristan, for instance, the Delfān (Minorsky, 1964, p. 314; Halm, p. 635).
Some authors refer to the Selsela and Delfān groups as originally being ʿAli-Elāhis, but also to the Sagvand and Pāpi tribes as being followers of this “secret religion” (Field, I, pp. 173-84; Minorsky, 1978, p. 823). In this context it is interesting that one of the subtribes of the Delfān confederation, the Chuwari, mentioned by Rawlinson (p. 107) as spending the winters in Holaylān and Kuhdašt and the summers in the plain of Ḵāva, is described by Freya Stark as “heretics”: “…these are Ali-Ilahis” (Stark, 1947, p. 34).
The religious literature of the sect is mainly written in Gurāni, and two important shrines of the sect, the tombs of Bābā Yādgār in Zohab and of Solṭān Esḥāq (Sahhāk, Ṣohāk) in Perdivar, are both located in Gurān territory. The central dogma of the Ahl-e Ḥaqq is the belief in seven successive manifestations or incarnations of the divinity.
These incarnations are compared to garments put on by the godhead (cf. the table in Minorsky, 1964, p. 307). The legends about Shah Ḵošin (or Bābā Ḵošin), one of the seven incarnations of the divinity (haftvāna), take place in Luristan and seem to represent an early phase in the development of the doctrine. Each manifestation is accompanied by a retinue of four helper angels. The name of one of those is Bābā Bozorg.
Another of the angels of Bābā Ḵošin is the local saint and Sufi poet of Hamadan, Bābā Ṭāher. Apart from the “Four Angels,” several other groups of saints are worshipped by Ahl-e Ḥaqq (Minorsky, 1964, pp. 306-16; Edmonds, 1969, pp. 89-101; Gabriel, pp. 125-28; Halm, pp. 635-37; see Ṣafizāda, pp. 17-18, 65-68, 74-78, 85-86, 101-15, 127-32).
The sect of the Ahl-e Ḥaqq was originally referred to by the European travelers of the 19th century and first of all by John Kinneir (p. 141). He reports with alacrity the information he has received about nocturnal festivals in the course of which “the garments of the fair sex” at a certain point are thrown into a heap and jumbled together.
This done, the lights are put out and the clothes distributed among the men present. The candles are then re-lighted. He explains that it is a rule of the society “that the lady must patiently submit to the embrace of the person who has become possessed of her dress, whether father, son, husband, or brother.”
When the lights have been put out once again, “the whole of the licentious tribe pass the remainder of the night in the indulgence of the most promiscuous lust.” Obviously, a scandalous and exiting account like this was bound to create some interest at the time. Henry Rawlinson was the first to pass on somewhat more reliable information (Rawlinson, pp. 52-95, 110), and as the regiment he commanded on the march from Zohab was in fact Gurāni, most of his men in all probability were adherents of Ahl-e Ḥaqq.
An especially noteworthy ceremony or institution is an initiation rite called sar-sepordan (the entrustment of the head; total commitment), in which the neophyte links himself to a spiritual master (pir). As a sign of this, a nutmeg is broken as a substitute for the head (Ṣafizāda, pp. 19-20).
Other sacrifices, raw and cooked, bloody and bloodless, derived from dervish practices also occur, and during these sessions burning coals are sometimes handled and stepped upon. Rites of the Ahl-e Ḥaqq also include assemblies (jam) with women participation, in which music is played and could easily account for the extraordinary interpretation brought forward by Kinneir (quoted above), and also for the nickname of “extinguishers of light” (čerāḡ söndüren) given by outsiders to the adherents of the sect (Minorsky, 1964, pp. 308-9).
The religion of the shrine
In an article concerned with the function of religion in (contemporary) Iranian society, Brian Spooner has made a useful distinction between what he calls “the religion of the mosque” and “the religion of the shrine” (Spooner, 1963, pp. 83-95). “The religion of the mosque” roughly corresponds to the official, literate religion, whereas “the religion of the shrine” is characterized by a hierarchy from the ordinary person through holy men, the imāms, and prophets, to God.
In rural districts like Luristan, where “the religion of the shrine” was practiced, a mollā (cleric) or a ṭalaba (theological student) might pay a visit during the months of special religious significance. If there was no resident mollā, there might be a dervish, a doʿānevis or Qorʾānḵˇān. There is often something mysterious about a dervish that seems to attract the attention of ordinary men, but a dervish has no specific religious function in the society.
The doʿānevis writes doʿās (invocation to God), which are a very popular commodity in rural Persia; and the Qorʾānḵvān, although often illiterate, is able to chant passages from the Qur’an at funerals; he also sometimes washes the dead (Spooner, 1963, p. 85).
Among the nomads and in the villages there are often quasi-religious persons or individuals attributed with certain religious qualities; they are either the descendants of the Prophet (sayyed) or people with the epithet Ḥāji, Karbalāʾi, or Mašhadi, signifying persons who have completed the pilgrimage to Mecca, Karbala, or Mashhad.
The presence of such persons among the tribes of Luristan is attested by the inscriptions at tombstones from cemeteries in northern Luristan (Demant Mortensen, 2010, pp. 93 ff.). The descendants of the Prophet have no special religious function, but their sheer presence is a reminder of Moḥammad, to whom they are considered to be nearer and dearer than ordinary people, and thus they are also a memento of Islam in general.
Moreover, they are believed to possess at least a minimum of baraka (blessing, divine grace), and they may be preferred by ordinary people for ceremonies intended to ward off the evil eye in which there is a widespread belief in most of the Near East (Donaldson, pp. 117 ff.; Kriss and Kriss-Heinrich, II, passim; Spooner, 1976, pp. 76-84).
It goes almost without saying that Moḥammad and his descendants are believed to be especially endowed with baraka, and they may in their turn communicate some of it to ordinary people. A special feature is that baraka does not cease to exist or to be active at the death of a person. On the contrary, to deceased persons is attributed a very powerful baraka. This may help to explain the great significance placed by the Shiʿites on the pilgrimage to tombs and emamzādas and the extraordinary measures taken to be buried near a holy tomb (Demant Mortensen, 1993, pp. 121, 125).
Shrines and emāmzādas
Until recently there were no mosques in Luristan outside the few towns (cf. the distribution map in Kleiss, opp. p. 66). On the other hand, the tombs of local pirs and saints, the emāmzādas, are frequently seen in the landscape. They are the focus of a lot of attention and also of pilgrimage. The word emāmzāda may signify an individual as well as the shrine dedicated to him, in the same way as pir or piri (elder or holy) may be used about a person or his tomb.
The actual structure of a shrine, whether of an emāmzāda or otherwise, may range in size from anything comparable to a tiny house to a larger mosque. It is often square, whitewashed, with a domed roof and with or without a courtyard and a cemetery around it. In the center of the building is the tomb or cenotaph, as the case may be, which is the focal point of attention. It represents the deceased person and is considered full of his baraka.
A number of shrines and emāmzādas are mentioned in the literature, but often just in passing (e.g., by Rawlinson; Stein; Edmonds, 1969; Minorsky, 1978; Haerinck and Overlaet; Demant Mortensen, 2010). The better known include Emāmzāda Šāhzāda Aḥmad, Emāmzāda Šāhzāda Moḥammed (or Solṭān Maḥmud), and Emāmzāda Solṭān Ebrāhim (or Bābā Bozorg), all alleged to be brothers of the eighth Imam (cf. Demant Mortensen, 2010, p. 21, n. 29; personal information from Khan ʿAbd-al-Ḥosayn Pur Abuḵadora, Hulian, 1974).
According to Rawlinson, they are all included among the Haft-tan “Seven [dervishes]” by the Ahl-e Ḥaqq, and that is why they are of great sanctity (Rawlinson, p. 95; Edmonds, 1969, p. 89; Ṣafizāda, pp. 144-45, 147-48, 203-4).
Emāmzāda Šāhzāda Aḥmad is situated in Bālā Gariva, about 60 km south of Khorramabad, midway between Khorramabad and Dezful. Referring to this shrine, Edmonds recalls that one day he had a visit by four men wearing red turbans.
A red turban is unique in Persia, at least in the western and central provinces, and is worn only by the guardians of Šāhzāda Aḥmad, the holiest shrine in Bālā Gariva (Demant Mottensen, 1993, Pl. 6.58; Izadpanāh, pp. 16-18). The red-turbaned guardians are known as the pāpi, but do not seem to be connected with the tribe of the same name (Edmonds, 1969, p. 354); however, Carl Feilberg, who has made a special study of this particular tribe, has several interesting and curious details to add (Feilberg, pp. 144-53).
For instance, he states that there are no adherents of the Ahl-e Ḥaqq among the Pāpi, “who find them very bad mannered” (Feilberg, pp. 152-53). Minorsky, on the contrary, states that the Sagvand and Pāpi tribes are the followers of this “secret religion” (Minorsky, 1978, p. 823). Feilberg also mentions the red turbans of the guardians and supplies the information that a visit to the Emāmzāda Šāhzāda Aḥmad is known to be particularly helpful to infertile women.
Not far from Emāmzāda Šāhzāda Aḥmad was another shrine, the Emāmzāda Pir Mār (Saint Snake) also of great sanctity. The saint was supposed to have been able to cure the bite of all venomous snakes, a power his descendants apparently had inherited (Rawlinson, p. 96).
The Emāmzāda Šāhzāda Moḥammad in the Holaylān valley is mentioned by Edmonds (1922, p. 451) as being a “pretentious building” with a great reputation for sanctity in the district and having a colony of sayyeds living in tents and huts around it. Various notables have contributed various parts, such as the bath and a golden ball over the dome.
Aurel Stein (p. 242) refers to it as “the conspicuous new shrine marking the supposed resting place of Imamzadeh Shah-zadeh Muhammad, a much frequented place for pilgrimage for Lurs, with a clusted of Saiyid’s dwellings” (cf. also Edelberg, p. 379; Demant Mortensen, 1993, pp. 128-29, Pls. 6.59-61).
The shrine of Solṭān Ebrāhim, worshipped throughout Luristan under the name of Bābā Bozorg, is mentioned by Rawlinson (p. 100), who says that the tomb is situated on the northeastern face of the plain of Ḵāwa. He adds that this is “the most holy spot in Luristan; for the common Lurs have no idea of religion farther than the worship of this their national saint.” Stein (p. 302) confirms the position and calls it a “much frequented place for pilgrimage” (see also Izadpanāh, pp. 310-11 and Pls. 28-29 on pp. 344-45).
The person said to be buried in an emāmzāda is often of a rather nebulous origin or descent, and quite often the same person is said to be buried, and is worshipped, in several different places.
One example of this is in Luristan near Širvān, where the tomb of ʿAbbās b. ʿAli, the half brother of the Shiʿite Imams Ḥasan and Ḥosayn, is considered to be of great sanctity and receives much attention. People from all over Luristan go here on pilgrimage, although ʿAbbās b. ʿAli also is supposed to be buried at Karbala in Iraq (Rawlinson, p. 56).
The most important point is, however, that it is advisable to visit these graves, because honoring an emāmzāda almost amounts to honoring the Imam himself, which by implication ultimately means honoring God, and this will hopefully lead to His intercession on the Day of Judgement.
In many cases the purpose of a visit to a shrine or an emāmzāda is to ask the granting of certain wishes or requests. The means of obtaining this goal are various and ingenious. Like the Kaʿba in Mecca, the tomb will often be covered by a cloth or surrounded by a latticework, which will be kissed. This is considered as a way of mollifying the emāmzāda and is not just a pious gesture.
It is important to get in contact with the baraka of the person resting there. This may be achieved by touching something in the place, by rubbing oneself with the oil that has been deposited as a gift by previous pilgrims and has now accumulated some of the baraka, or by leaving behind one’s rosary (tasbiḥ) to be charged with baraka and collected at a later time.
When visiting an emāmzāda, it is not unusual to bring along presents, for example, candles, oil, foodstuffs, or even live animals to be sacrificed on the spot. What was originally intended as a votive offering—to the holy personage supposedly interred there—at the present time more often ends up as a present for the warden of the place. In any case, it has now become more customary not to bring anything until the wish has been fulfilled.
This rather pragmatic change from “I offer Thee this, and please may I have” to “If You grant me this, I will give You that” attitude, secures a minimum of waste and disappointment on both sides (Demant Mortensen, 2010, p. 21).
In Luristan people also seek out the shrines and emāmzādas for a number of other reasons, including oath-taking in legal cases, seeking cures for ailments, both physical and mental (Fazel, p. 234), pilgrimage, and the festivities at the end of Ramazan, the ʿid al-feṭr, and the processions and performances of the passion play (taʿzia) during the first ten days of Moḥarram in commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Ḥosayn and his family at Karbala in 680 CE (cf. Chelkowsky; Demant Mortensen, 1991).
Moḥarram processions and the taʿzia
In Iran, Moḥarram processions and recitations existed side by side for about 250 years, and both became more and more complex and refined, until the middle of the 18th century, by which time they were fused (Chelkowski, pp. 4 ff.). The result was a new dramatic form called taʿzia-ḵvāni or just taʿzia, in which the siege of Karbala was still the core, but as time went by, separate plays around individual heroes were also developed.
The taʿzia thus is a compromise between the moving procession and the stationary recitation, and as such it was first staged at open squares or street intersections but soon moved into the courtyards of bazaars, caravansaries, emāmzādas, or even private houses.
Each of the first ten days of Moḥarram featured its own special event commemorating the suffering of Imam Ḥosayn and his party, culminating with the big processions of the 10th of Moḥarram, the Āšurāʾ, as a conclusion (see, e.g., Massé, pp. 122 ff., tr. pp. 117 ff.).
An Āšurāʾ procession might consist of several groups following hard on the heels of each other and all acting some part of the tragedy at Karbala. For example, riderless, saddled horses illustrate in the funeral procession the horses of the martyrs who are now dead.
In the case of only one riderless horse in the procession, it signifies Imam Ḥosayn’s horse (Ḏu’l-janāḥ). Often there will be fastened to the saddle some objects emblematical of Imam Ḥosayn (e.g., see Kippenberg, figs. 1-4). When the riderless horses are brought forward in the funeral procession, it is a sign that the illustrious owners are now dead, and a great moan from the crowd watching goes up in the air.
There may be flags carried along, with the names of Ḥosayn and other martyrs embroidered on them, and banners (ʿalam) representing in the towns different quarters or guilds, and in the country different emāmzādas. There may also be long sticks or poles (kotol) hung with pieces of cloth and surmounted by a metal hand (panja).
The open hand (which is identified by the Sunnites as the hand of Fāṭema and is used as an amulet to ward off the evil eye) bears a quite different meaning for the Shiʿites. In the Moḥarram processions, it commemorates the fact that at Karbala Ḥosayn and his companions were prevented from drawing water, and when ʿAbbās, Ḥosayn’s half brother, tried to fetch some water from the river, his hands were cut off by the enemy. ʿAbbās then tried to hold the gourd between his teeth, but it was immediately pierced by an arrow.
Everybody gets the message instantly when the water-sellers at the Moḥarram processions carry a gourd and cry: “Drink to the memory of the martyr of Karbala!” Many other incidents were commemorated in this way, and groups representing the martyrs with, for example, limbs amputated, an axe sunk into the body, arrows sticking out everywhere, all combine to create the most perfect illusion of reality.
Usually there would be a man or a boy disguised as a lion, covering the supposed body of Imam Ḥosayn in the procession or at the taʿzia, and representing the miraculous lion that is reported to have kept watch on Imam Ḥosayn’s body and protected it from further profanation after the massacre at Karbala (see below).
Around 1930 the taʿzia was banned by the government for socio-political reasons, but, a renewed interest in it was raised during the post-World War II period (Chelkowsky, pp.. 262 ff.). It lived on in distant villages and isolated areas such as Luristan, but due to the lack of written sources it is not possible to know with any certainty to what extent the Moḥarram rites were celebrated in Luristan over the last 200 years.
However, a few people who have been in Luristan for longer periods of time have left descriptions that might suggest that the tradition was kept alive all along. For instance, Arnold Wilson relates how the evenings during a stay with a local khan were spent, listening to a blind storyteller, who was an inexhaustible source of local politics and history, Lur songs, and extracts from the Šāh-nāma of Ferdowsi, holding the listeners around the fire spellbound for hours by the dramatic modulations of his voice (Wilson, pp. 63-65).
He was succeeded by a sayyed, who first conducted the assembly in prayer and then followed with “a prose narrative of the sad fate of the patron saint of Persia, the martyred Husain, which reduced many of the audience to genuine tears, though it is not yet the month (Muharram) in which his death is called to mind” (Wilson, p. 64).
Carl Feilberg (pp. 144-46) remarks that there is a queer, agitated feeling in the air during Moḥarram, which is more noticeable or conspicuous since there are not many signs of religious fanaticism, but rather a certain degree of tolerance. On the occasion of the “Ḥosayn festival, mollās bring forth banners (ʿalam) from an emāmzāda.
The people circle around the banners, the poles of which are covered in red cloth, while they sing and beat their breast three times, and take their heads in their hands repeatedly. Someone reads the story of Ḥosayn from one end to the other, if possible every hour of the day. A man with a sword is excited to the point of cutting his head. Pieces of cloth are hanging down from banners. Every time someone pays a few coins to the mollā, he receives a shred of the cloth.”
Another observation was made inside the Emāmzāda Šāhzāda Moḥammad in the Holaylān Valley in 1963 (Demant Mortensen, 2010, p. 29). People had come from far away and assembled in the courtyard of the emāmzāda, where on the 8th day of Moḥarram a taʿzia was being performed for hours on end, continuing into the night of the Āšurāʾ. Earlier a procession of flagellants went across the valley floor, from tent camp to tent camp, which at that time of the year (June) was spread over the plain.
These few examples will suffice to show how important aspects of the religion were being taught by illustration and performance among the nomadic population of Luristan. The mental images evoked at a Moḥarram procession, at a rawża-ḵvāni (mourning ritual commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Ḥosayn) or a taʿzia performance are so strong and potent that this kind of “illiterate religion,” as it might conveniently be termed, adds another dimension to the metaphor phrased by Umberto Eco that “images are the literature of the lay-men” (Eco, p. 41).
Nomadic cemeteries with pictorial stelae and tombstones
The nomadic cemeteries of Luristan are nearly all placed near shrines or along old migratory routes. Their inscribed and decorated tombstones and stelae turn them into an important source for the mapping of tribal migrations during the 19th and early 20th century and for our understanding of certain aspects of the religious beliefs and ritual actions of the nomads.
Allusions to the tombstones of Luristan and the motifs they represent include incidental observations by travelers passing through the country in the 19th and early 20th century (e.g., Rawlinson, pp. 53, 57-58; Herzfeld, p. 59; Stark, 1932, p. 504). The topic has later been dealt with by Feilberg (pp. 137-41, figs. 128-31), Wilhelm Eilers, Jørgen Meldgaard, Clare Goff, Leon Vanden Berghe (pp. 19-20 and Pl. VII, figs. 1-2), and Houchang Pourkarim (pp. 54-57, photograph on p. 25). Starting during 1974-77, an extensive, systematic study of nomadic cemeteries in northern Luristan was carried out by a member of the Danish Archaeological Expedition (Demant Mortensen, 1983, 1991, 1996, and 2010).
It seems that most of the nomadic cemeteries in northern Luristan, along with the tribes that they represent, can be traced back to the late 18th or early 19th century.
The earliest known nomadic tombstone, dated 1209/1794, is in the cemetery of Kazābād in the Holaylān valley (Demant Mortensen 2010, p. 167). In a historical context, the emergence of the tombstones coincide with the withdrawal of the viceroy governor (wāli) and his retinue from Khorramabad into Pošt-e Kuh in 1796, a move that was occasioned by the attempt of the first Qajar shah to reduce and weaken his power and authority.
By the end of the 1920s and the early 1930s, there is a dramatic decline in the number of nomadic cemeteries, a picture clearly reflecting the drastic changes forced upon the nomads of Luristan by the policy of Reżā Shah (r. 1924-41). Starting early in the 1920s, Reżā Shah and his army attempted forcibly to “civilize” (taḵta-qāpu), that is, to disarm and settle, the nomadic tribes throughout the country.
By the mid-1930s this policy had resulted in an economic, social, and cultural breakdown of the old tribal structures of Luristan and in a partial cessation of nomadic migrations and of memorial stelae and obelisks at the cemeteries. The latest known pictorial stele, dated 1354/1935, has been registered at the cemetery of Pela Kabud in the Holaylān valley (Demant Mortensen, 2010, pp. 73, 148, fig. 98).
At the cemeteries the graves were usually marked by a horizontal tombstone lying within the frame of stones marking the outline of the grave. In addition, an obelisk or a stele depicting in lively scenes animals and human beings was sometimes erected at the head of the grave (e.g., see Demant Mortensen, 1993, pp. 134, 138, Pls. 6.64, 6.66).
These extraordinary pictorial stones, unique in an Islamic context, were carved and used by the nomads. Like the horizontal tombstones, they were erected for men as well as for women, although more frequently for the men.
The flat-lying gravestones bear an inscription stating the name of the deceased, the name of his or her father, and the name of the tribe to which he or she belonged. The time of death is always mentioned by year, according to the Islamic lunar calendar, and occasionally also by month.
The rank or title of the deceased may also be recorded. In rare cases, a few lines from a poem may be incised along the edge of the tombstone, but apparently never a quotation from the Qurʾan. This would be inappropriate, since people might step on the stones, and sheep and goats and other animals crossing a cemetery might soil the tombstones.
At the base of the stone there is nearly always a field with pictorial symbols that are characteristic of men and women respectively. With unfailing certainty they will indicate whether the deceased was a woman or a man. In the case of women, the symbols will include a comb, a mirror, and a pair of scissors, a symbol designating a carpet, and in a few cases a kohl-pin.
On a man’s tombstone is most often depicted a prayer stone, a string of prayer beads, a washing-set consisting of a ewer and a bowl, and a man’s comb, characterized by its half-circular shape. It appears that the symbols characterizing a woman on the gravestone to all intents and purposes reflect her profane, daily life.
In contrast to this a man is characterized on the gravestones with symbols full of religious connotations meant to turn the thought towards his pious purity: a washing-set, a rosary, and a prayer stone. This emphasis upon the religious aspects of life depicted on the men’s tombstones in a subtle and subconscious way perhaps reflected the Lur’s conception of the role and status in real life, where the men were the external providers and protectors, while the women lived in the private sphere.
Obviously, there is a great difference but it does not follow automatically that there was an evaluation in terms of status attached to the different roles within the tribal community. Wilson (p. 156), who lived a long time among the Lurs, wrote a eulogy of the Lur women, who bear the burden of the day in most senses of the phrase, in the following words. “without a wife a man is as helpless and useless as half a pair of anything else— and [he] knows it.”
In some cases a panel with an enigmatic geometric figure may be found on the gravestones, interspaced usually between the fourth and the fifth line of the inscription. It shows a cross on a square background with a kind of step design on both sides, opening up into tiny “channels” leading out from or into the center. The simplest interpretation of this motif is that it is a purely decorative element.
There is, however, one other possibility: the central motifs are almost identical to the central motifs in the great Persian garden carpets from the 17th and 18th centuries, and to similar motifs seen in many Caucasian carpets and tribal rugs. It is a characteristic feature of these carpet designs that the design is geometrical and that there are channels leading out of, or into, the central motif, precisely as in the medial panels of the gravestones.
In the carpets these channels and pools symbolize the water channels in a garden, or by extension the Garden of Paradise (bāḡ-e behešt). The connection between real, geometrical garden plans, their reproduction in carpets, and the religious conceptions about the Garden of Paradise has often been demonstrated.
Against this background and in a religious context, at nomadic cemeteries, it has been suggested that the geometric motifs of the middle panels on the tombstones, like the central figures of the garden carpets, not only fulfill a decorative purpose, but also contain symbolic connotations, which among the nomads of Luristan would direct the mind towards the Garden of Paradise (Demant Mortensen, 1996, pp. 176-78).
The stelae, which sometimes were erected at the head of the grave, usually have pictures on both sides, showing distinctly different themes. One side, facing the grave, shows scenes from the life of the deceased. A typical motif at a woman’s stele would be a vertical loom with a half-finished carpet, surrounded by two or three women each with a weft-beater in her hand.
The men’s stelae would show a mounted horseman with a small shield over his shoulder, with a lance or gun in his hand and his sword attached to the characteristic high wooden saddle. The rider is often engaged in a hunt, accompanied by two or three tribesmen, each carrying a gun with a fixed bayonet.
The other side of the stelae shows a similar picture, but with marked differences in content. Here the representation is a reflection of rituals associated with death and burial. The horse is rider-less, and it is clearly tethered with a mallet at the head and at the hind leg. The weapons of the deceased, a gun, a sword, and a shield, are tied to the high wooden saddle. Below this scene three women are shown, their arms resting on each other’s shoulders.
The women are probably shown as participants in the funeral procession or doing čupi dance. Singing, wailing, and dancing were practiced by mourning women as part of the burial rites in Luristan throughout the 19th and most of the 20th century. An emotional incident reflecting these rituals is reported by Freya Stark, who in 1931 spent some time in the plains of Ḵāva and Delfān.
She relates how Yusof Khan, a young leader of the Nur-ʿAlis “beloved by all the northern Lurs was taken and executed in Hamadan; his followers, including my guide, lifted his body from the cemetery and brought it to Kermanshah, and then carried it with high wailing dirges four days’ journey to its burial-place at Hulailan” (Stark, 1947, pp. 27-32).
The picture of a riderless horse seems to reflect an old Iranian tradition where the horse of the deceased was brought along in the funerary procession to the cemetery, with the deceased’s turban, his sword, bow and arrows, lance, and in general anything that might serve to identify his standing and strength.
To lead a horse after the hearse or bier at a funeral seems to have been, if not a universal habit, at least a widespread custom also known from Luristan, a reflection, perhaps, of a belief in an afterlife in which the deceased will need the horse and the weapons that he used to have in his life on earth (cf., e.g., Tavernier, p. 722; Quenstedt, pp. 254-56; Demant Mortensen, 2010, pp. 84 ff.).
There is, however, another possible explanation for the riderless horse as it appears on the Luristani stelae. An underlying meaning of the motif might be that the representation of a riderless, equipped horse on the tombstone in the same way as Imam Ḥosayn’s horse is represented in the ʿĀšurāʾ processions during Moḥarram reminds the passer-by of Imam Ḥosayn’s martyrdom, and thus his attentions would automatically be focused on the Day of Judgement and on pious hopes for the afterlife (Demant Mortensen, 1991, pp. 85-86).
As a derivation of this, the intended message could also have been that the person interred in the tomb had been of a pious observation. This seems to be quite a probable explanation and association with the nomadic setting in Luristan in the 19th and early 20th century, as it is indirectly testified by the elegies sung by the wives of the Wāli Ḥosaynqoli Khan on the occasion of his death, ca. 1900 (cf. Mann, pp. 145-52).
Supernatural powers
Apart from the more or less orthodox religious notions, there seems to be a widespread belief in supernatural beings in Iran (cf. e.g., Donaldson, passim; Massé, pp. 351-68). There are, however, considerable regional variations in their occurrence, form, and attributes, and a supernatural being reported in one area may be unknown in another. As far as Luristan is concerned, the most extensive information on this topic has been provided by Amanolahi-Baharvand (pp. 142-78).
According to this source, the Baharvand, and probably a major part of the nomadic tribes of Luristan, have had a dualistic concept of the soul and body. Without the soul the body was nothing, and the soul could leave the body at will, in the form of a flying insect, like a mosquito, with the nose as a passage. It was believed that, when a person is asleep, his soul is out, and when it returns to the body, the person awakes.
It was also believed that everybody has an identical spiritual being in the sky. When someone dies, the soul enters this being or spirit, which descends from heaven into the grave. When the spirit has entered the grave, it will, together with the soul, find the way to the eternal world. On the way, there is a bridge, narrower than a hair, which has to be crossed. When the spirits reach the bridge, they will be met by the sheep that were sacrificed in this world, and these will be ready to carry them across the bridge.
The good ones will have no trouble getting across the bridge, but the bad ones will have serious problems. On the other side of the bridge is the gate to the eternal world, and after Judgement the righteous will go to Paradise, while the wicked are sent to Hell. It was, moreover, believed that the coming of the Mahdi would mean an end to both of these worlds, because it would mean the creation of a completely new universe with freedom and justice for everyone (Amanolahi-Baharvand, p. 148).
This somewhat diverging version of the official eschatology existed alongside a belief in several kinds of personified supernatural beings to which human emotions and feelings were attributed. Above all there is God (Ḵodā), followed by various religious personalities such as ʿAli, Moḥammad, the Imams and emāmzādas, and the local saints and prophets in Luristan. ʿAli is the strongest of all, almost comparable to God, and certainly greater than Moḥammad (Amanolahi-Baharvand, p. 150).
The belief in predestination stems from the concept that God determines the destiny of every human being and all other creatures of the universe, so everything that happens is the will of God. He is the absolute ruler and owner of the universe. He can make people sick, poor, rich, crippled, and blind. He is omniscient and omnipresent, and He has it in His power to destroy everything in an instant if He so wishes.
Although supernatural power or ability is attributed to God and all prophets and Islamic saints, they are in a different category from the other supernatural beings. God is held responsible for death and disease as well as for everything else.
But there is nevertheless, at the same time, a distinction made between natural and supernatural causes of such misfortunes. This seemingly contradictory, and totally irreconcilable, assertion will just have to be accepted, in the same way as those diseases and misfortunes that cannot immediately be understood are attributed to supernatural forces (cf. Amanolahi-Baharvand, pp. 150 ff.).
Dangerous supernatural beings include malakat, which is a local derivation from Arabic, meaning angels (e.g., malak al-mawt, the Angel of Death, often used in the Qurʾanic vocabulary). The Luri concept is somewhat different. It was believed that malakats have all the characteristics of human beings, except that they are invisible and also have the power to change form.
This means that they can and will turn themselves into, for example, a human being, a cat, or a piece of wood. They never die, and they may be found in many places, such as ruins, mountains, and dark corners. They were feared because it was believed that they had the power to make people ill or insane. Sometimes they fell in love with a woman and caused her to behave abnormally.
The malakat might take a person and replace him with an identical malakat. The same might happen with a corpse, so if a body remained unburied overnight, it had to be guarded every minute. If someone is behaving crazily, it is believed that she or he might be possessed by a malakat, and a mollā (cleric) may try to capture it by torturing the afflicted person and thus drive it away (Amanolahi-Baharvand, p. 154).
Other groups of dangerous supernatural beings include the ḡuls and the divs (demons). In folktales the div is described as looking more or less like a human being, only larger and with the capacity of changing its form; it sleeps most of the time, and is often found at the bottom of wells.
Among the Baharvand in Luristan, it is believed that the div no longer exists, but that it has been replaced by another type of demon, which is extremely dangerous. This is a human-like creature, which may inflict injuries and illnesses resulting in death upon a person. In these cases it is beyond the powers of a sayyed or a mollā to help.
The Tofangči (rifleman) is the name given to an invisible hunter with male characteristics. If sudden unexpected deaths take place, it is believed to have been caused by the Tofangči, and if any of the herds were struck, the nomads would immediately migrate to another campsite.
Yāl, otherwise referred to as āl (cf. Donaldson, pp. 28-31; Massé, pp. 44, 356, tr., p. 348), is a supernatural being with the attributes of a female, a kind of witch, often described as four-footed, and with a tail. She is very dangerous for women in labor and is wont to snatch away babies. In Luristan she is known to have only two legs and no tail, but she is very tall and has large teeth. If a woman is attacked by yāl, a yāl-catcher will beat her with a stick in order to tell where the yāl is, and a sheep will be killed and its liver and heart taken to her.
To counterbalance the feared influence of all the malevolent, supernatural demons there is also a belief in a few benevolent creatures. For instance every person is believed to have a baḵt (lit. fate), which is the supernatural guardian of every individual (Donaldson, pp. 175-76).
The baḵt is supposed to be identical with its owner, and it protects his land and property. If someone’s baḵt is active, everything is prosperous for the whole family, the herds increase, and so on; but a baḵt may fall asleep, in which case it takes the form of an animal. If that should happen, all sorts of misery starts, and it is almost impossible to find and wake up the baḵt. If a man is unlucky and, for instance, is losing herds or even children, he may say that his baḵt has fallen asleep.
Another well-known group is the fairies (pari), who are the most beautiful of all supernatural beings and look just like humans. They may marry among themselves and have a social organization and even a king of their own, Šāh-pario, but they may also marry human beings. If this happens, it must be kept a secret; otherwise, the pari will escape.
Many people claim to have seen the paris dancing and singing, and it is possible to capture them when they are bathing in a river, but one must be very quick, jump into the river, and insert a needle into the hair of the pari before she becomes invisible. When the needle is inserted in the hair, the pari becomes the wife of the captor and will always be near him, but at the same time invisible to others. It is possible for such couples to have children, but they are also invisible, except for the father (Amanolahi-Baharvand, pp. 158-60).
It is in the same somewhat shady and ill-defined border area between religion, superstition, and folklore that one may find some impersonal, supernatural forces at work. They might for the sake of clarity be divided into “powers” and “matters” of supernatural character. The supernatural “powers” reckoned with in Luristan include baraka, bahra, rišarr and časm-e bad (Amanolahi-Baharvand, pp. 160 ff.).
Baraka, or blessing, has already been described above, and bahra has something of the same inherited quality. A person could have the bahra, that is the property or capacity of hunting or capturing certain personified, supernatural beings, or curing disorders caused by these. In that case he will nearly always be successful in these matters. Like baraka, it is a good quality, which cannot be used against other people.
The words riḵayr and rišarr are combinations of Luri and Arabic, and they signify a good or benevolent face and an evil face, respectively. Thus it is believed that some people have a “good face” (riḵayr) and they will cause prosperity wherever they appear; on the other hand, if someone on a journey sees an “evil face” (rišarr), he will worry that the journey will be fruitless or even dangerous (Demant Mortensen, 2010, pp. 20-21, 36).
This idea seems to be closely related to the notion of the bad or evil eye, in which there is a widespread belief in most of the Near East. Three main types of evil eyes are recognized in Luristan: čašm-e šur (“envious eye,” lit: “salty eye,” normally permanent), čašme-e nāpāk (“dirty eye,” normally temporary), and čašme-e bad (“bad eye,” normally momentary).
It is a problem that a person with an evil eye may unintentionally cause danger and disaster. The number of causes and cures enumerated, and the amount of time spent in anxiety, fear, and inconvenience caused by this belief is quite striking. Supernatural power may also be obtained through certain acts either of piety or of ceremonial sacrifice of animals.
Certain sayyeds were believed to have obtained supernatural power, partly through their descent from the Prophet, and partly through their own acts. Those who had obtained this status were regarded as next to holy, and with a supernatural power to cure both physical and mental illnesses. People would make an oath by the turban of such a person, or by his copy of the Qurʾan, which was believed to be much more powerful than an ordinary copy (Demant Mortensen, 2010, pp. 36-37).
This is leading to the other category of supernatural forces, that of “matter” or “substance.”
The Qur’an itself is believed to possess enormous supernatural forces, which would keep at bay the many malevolent supernatural beings, and also illnesses.
Objects related to emāmzādas, especially pieces of cloth from banners (ʿalam), protected the bearer from snake bites, harmful supernatural beings, and other dangerous creatures, and every year during Moḥarram the guardians literally took their ʿalams to pieces and distributed them among the people, who would sew them on to their clothing.
Also some trees were regarded as sacred and invested with supernatural power, possibly a concept of pre-Islamic origin.
Often, but not always, they are found close to a shrine, such as the Emāmzāda Šāhzāda Moḥammad in the Holaylān valley (Stein, p. 242).
Hundreds and hundreds of pieces of cloth may be seen hanging on such trees “in greater profusion than leaves” as de Bode puts it (I, p. 283), each representing a vow or wish uttered.
While others might silently wish upon a falling star, these rags of cloth each denote a “visible wish” as it were (Demant Mortensen, 1993, pp. 122-23, Pls. 6.56-57).
In order to remain on friendly terms with the personified supernatural beings surrounding them, and at the same time to protect themselves from all the malevolent powers lurking everywhere, the Lurs employ a complex set of ancient local ceremonies and adapted Islamic rituals, which are almost impossible to disentangle.
Most of the nomads in Luristan would have only a superficial knowledge of Islam, and many religious acts are mixed with older traditions, the origin of which remains obscure.
Sacrifices are normally made either to Imam ʿAli or to the local shrine or emāmzāda, but not directly to God.
Sacrifices are made for different purposes; for instance, at the birth of a first child (son), or people make a vow that they will make a sacrifice if a wish be realized, or if they recover from an illness.
A special kind of animal sacrifice is performed when a person dies (ʿaqiqa). The animal has to be a sheep and more than six months old.
An Arabic formula is whispered in its ear before it is killed. Then it has to be boiled, and the bones buried unbroken. None of the immediate family of the deceased can take part in this meal, as it is believed that the deceased in the next world will be carried across the bridge by the sheep to the gates of the eternal world. In Luristan a special offering (alafa) is also made to the dead annually a few days before the New Year (Nowruz).
The offering consists of sweetmeat (ḥalwā) and bread, and during the preparation of these foodstuffs the names of those deceased in whose memory the meals are being prepared must be mentioned, and they will then receive the sacrifice (Amonolahi-Baharvand, pp. 170-76; Demant Mortensen, 2010, pp. 36-37).
Epilogue
Fredrik Barth (p. 146), following his description of some ceremonies, rituals, games, and beliefs among the Bāṣeri tribe in Fars, reaches the following conclusion about religion: “In general, I feel that the above attempt at an exhaustive description of the ceremonies and explicit practices of the Basseri reveals a ritual life of unusual poverty.”
The same verdict has been passed by almost everybody who has expressed an opinion on this matter as far as the Lurs are concerned. It is hoped, however, that the observations in the preceding pages might help to build a case for the opposite opinion. There was no ritual or religious poverty among the Lurs; on the contrary, the atmosphere was positively crowded with images of supernatural and other beings. The belief in them reflects truly religious notions, although these do not always conform to official doctrines.
Όλες τις βιβλιογραφικές παραπομπές μπορείτε να βρείτε εδώ:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/luristan-05-religion-beliefs
Περισσότερα:
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/luristan-04-origin-nomadism
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bronzes-of-luristan
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/luristan-bronzes-i-the-field-research-
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/luristan-bronzes-ii-chronology
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Лурестан
http://etnolog.ru/people.php?id=LURY
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luristan_bronze
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorestan_Province
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lurs
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luri_language
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luri_music
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https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/life_in_lorestan.docx
that time the persian sassanid emperor took all the people from the roman city he took over and moved them to a new city just outside the capital city of his own empire and called it Your City But Better Cause It was Built By Me
Fruits commonly eaten in the ancient Mediterranean in Roman frescoes and mosaics. How many can you recognize?
The Alexander Romance (a series of fictional stories about Alexander the Great) doesn’t just celebrate Alexander’s virility and skill in warfare; it also portrays him as insatiably curious about the world. In one story, Alexander descends deep under the sea in a primitive diving bell. He brought with him a rooster (to help him keep time by crowing), a dog, and a cat.
We have a version of the story from the Mughal Empire in the late 1500s:
And another from Germany in the 1400s:
{WHF} {Ko-Fi} {Medium}
Nefertum, god of the lotus and son of Ptah and Sekhmet.
Abu Muhammad Ahmad ibn Atiq al-Azdi, Kitab al-baytarah (Book on Veterinary Medicine), 1223.
Courtesy Alain Truong
A depiction of iconoclasm, from a 9th-century psalter. The iconoclasts believed that praying to works of religious art was tantamount to idolatry. Several Byzantine rulers encouraged the destruction of religious icons, which helped to widen the gap between Byzantine Christians and the Popes.
{WHF} {Ko-Fi} {Medium}
Polo Games, War Games, the Tzykanisterion of Constantinople, the Silk Roads, and the Turanian-Iranian Foundations of Romiosyni, i.e. today's Eastern Romans (falsely denigrated as 'Greeks')
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 4η Μαΐου 2019.
Αναπαράγοντας τμήμα ημερησίου σεμιναρίου, το οποίο είχα παρουσιάσει στο Πεκίνο τον Ιανουάριο του 2019 σχετικά με ορισμένα σύγχρονα ψευδο-έθνη της Ασίας, της Ευρώπης και της Αφρικής, τα οποία έχουν παρασκευασθεί από τους δυτικούς αποικιοκράτες, ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης, στο κείμενό του αυτό, απαριθμεί μία σειρά ιστορικών θεμάτων σχετικών με την παρασκευή της ψευδέστατης ταυτότητας των δήθεν Νεο-ελλήνων και την σύσταση της ψευδοϊστορίας που διδάσκεται στην δήθεν 'Ελλάδα'. Είναι φυσικό ότι όλα αυτά τα θέματα, τα τόσο καθοριστικά για το παρελθόν και την ταυτότητα της Ρωμιοσύνης, ολοσχερώς αγνοούνται από τους σημερινούς ψευδο-Νεοέλληνες του επάρατου νοτιο-βαλκανικού κρατιδίου, επειδή αυτοί έχουν πέσει θύματα αμορφώτων και τρισαθλίων παραχαρακτών, δηλαδή των 'ελληνιστών' και των 'βυζαντινολόγων'. Έτσι, τυφλοί και άχρηστοι οι σημερινοί ψευδο-Νεοέλληνες, έχοντας απωλέσει την ρωμέικη ορθόδοξη ταυτότητά τους, βρίσκονται σε κατάσταση δουλείας ασυγκρίτως χειρότερης εκείνης της οθωμανικής περιόδου.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2019/05/04/πόλο-πόλεμος-το-τζυκανιστήριον-κωνστ/ ======================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Αμόρφωτοι κι ανιστόρητοι οι διάφοροι Νεοέλληνες εθνικιστές ή προπαγανδιστές ελληνοκεντρισμού, ελληνισμού κι αρχαιολατρείας θέλουν να ξεχνούν ότι στα χρόνια της Χριστιανικής Ρωμαϊκής Αυτοκρατορίας, οι Ρωμιοί ένοιωθαν αποστροφή για τους Ολυμπιακούς Αγώνες της Αρχαιότητας αλλά ελάτρευαν κι έπαιζαν μετά μανίας το Τζυκάνιον.
Αν θέλετε να τιμήσετε τον Κωνσταντίνο ΙΑ’ Παλαιολόγο, αν θέλετε να πιστεύετε ότι πάλι με χρόνια με καιρούς πάλι δικά μας θάναι, αν σέβεστε την θρησκεία των προγόνων σας, αν είστε Χριστιανός Ορθόδοξος, τότε πρέπει να ξέρετε ότι τζυκανιστήρια (τεράστια στάδια όπου έπαιζαν το τζυκάνιον) υπήρχαν σ’ αρκετές πόλεις της Ρωμανίας – όχι μόνον στην Κωνσταντινούπολη.
Κι’ αυτό συνέβαινε για τον πολύ απλό λόγο ότι αυτό το τουρανικής – ιρανικής καταγωγής άθλημα που από την σασανιδική ιρανική αυλή του 5ου αιώνα μεταδόθηκε στην Βασιλεύουσα του Θεοδοσίου Β’ βοηθάει πολύ στην εξάσκηση του αυτοκρατορικού ιππικού. Το τζυκάνιον είναι αυτό που λέμε σήμερα πόλο.
Οι Ακρίτες κι η ακριτική παράδοση το τίμησαν, ο Βασίλειος Α’ Μακεδών το λάτρευε, ο ‘αὐτοκράτωρ πιστὸς εὑσεβὴς βασιλεὺς’ Αλέξανδρος Γ’ που βασίλευσε 13 μήνες το 912-913 σκοτώθηκε παίζοντας τζυκάνιον, και πολλοί Ρωμιοί ιστορικοί όπως ο Ἰωάννης Κίνναμος έγραψαν γι’ αυτό. Η Άννα Κομνηνή διασώζει κι αυτή πληροφορίες για τα θρυλικά τζυκανιστήρια της αυτοκρατορίας.
Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_(Byzantine_emperor)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Kinnamos
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzykanisterion
Ενδεικτικό του πως γράφεται και ποια είναι η πραγματική Ιστορία που είναι απαγορευμένη στο νεοελληνικό ψευτοκράτος των θεόστραβων κι αργόσχολων μονιμάδων του Δημοσίου, τζυκανιστήρια αναφέρονται ότι υπήρχαν στην Σπάρτη και στην Αθήνα, πόλεις-εμβλήματα της Αρχαίας Ελλάδας που συμμετείχαν στους Ολυμπιακούς Αγώνες αλλά στα χριστιανικά χρόνια προτιμούσαν αθλήματα τουρανικής κι ιρανικής προέλευσης.
Ειρωνεία της Ιστορίας κι εκμηδενισμός των ανεγκέφαλων κι αμόρφωτων της ΕΣΤΙΑ TV κι άλλων ψευτομασωνικών, φιλοσιωνιστικών και νεο-ναζιστικών ομάδων που με τακτική Γκαίμπελς επαναλαμβάνουν το αισχρό κι αυτοκαταστροφικό ψέμμα του ‘διαχρονικού ελληνικού πολιτισμού’…..
Σε Αθήνα και Σπάρτη πριν από 1000 χρόνια, οι Ρωμιοί προτιμούσαν την τουρανική και την ιρανική πολιτισμική κληρονομιά, το αυτοκρατορικό άθλημα της θρυλικής δυναστείας των Καϋανιδών που περιγράφει ο Φερντοουσί στο Σαχναμέ, κι απολάμβαναν το τζυκάνιον μιμούμενοι τον Σιγιαβάς, θρυλικό ήρωα του Ιράν, και τον Αφρασιάμπ, μυθικό βασιλιά του Τουράν (που το όνομά του είναι το παραδοσιακό όνομα της Σαμαρκάνδης). Κι όλα αυτά για αιώνες πολλούς πριν το Μαντζικέρτ και πριν να φανούν στον ορίζοντα οι Σελτζούκοι.
Αυτό ήταν μία μόνο διάσταση των πολιτισμικών ανταλλαγών που έγιναν χάρη στους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού – ένα θέμα που οι Έλληνες ψευτο-πανεπιστημιακοί είχαν εξοστρακίσει κι απαγορεύσει από τον φόβο τους ότι η αληθινή Ιστορία θα ισοπέδωνε τα βρωμερά, ψευτο-μασωνικά, σιωνιστικά, ρατσιστικά, φασιστικά, νεο-ναζιστικά ψέμματά τους περί της τάχα ‘ανωτερότητος του αρχαίου ελληνικού πολιτισμού’ – κάτι που έμπρακτα οι απόγονοι των Αρχαίων Ελλήνων έδειξαν ότι δεν πίστευαν.
Τώρα όμως που η Κίνα επιβάλλει παγκοσμίως την θεματολογία των Δρόμων του Μεταξιού, η αληθινή Ιστορία θα σβύσει το ψέμμα του ‘ελληνισμού’ που κατέστρεψε την Ρωμιοσύνη και την Ορθοδοξία, ξεφτιλίζοντας την Ελλάδα σαν ένα ανίκανο και χρεωκοπημένο κρατίδιο.
Το πόλο λοιπόν παραπέμπει στους ιρανικούς θρύλους και συμβολισμούς, καίριο ηρωϊκό πρόσωπο των οποίων είναι ο Σιγιαβάς του οποίου το όνομα κατέληξε ως ‘σαβάς’ (Savaş) να σημαίνει στα τουρκικά ‘πόλεμος’. Ο πόλεμος μεταξύ του Σιγιαβάς, διαδόχου του θρόνου του Ιράν, και του Αφρασιάμπ, βασιλιά του Τουράν, ήταν μια τρομερή σελίδα του ιρανικού-τουρανικού θρύλου που γράφηκε με φόντο το τζυκάνιον (πόλο) και που πρέπει να ξέρουμε πολύ καλύτερα από τις ιστορίες του εμφυλίου των Αρχαίων Ελλήνων που γράφει ο Θουκυδίδης.
Γιατί οι θρύλοι είναι προτύπωση των εσχάτων με συμβολικούς όρους, ενώοι ιστορίες του παρελθόντος δεν αφορούν ούτε το παρόν ούτε το μέλλον.
Δείτε το βίντεο:
Поло в Гилгите, Северный Пакистан – Как древний имперский спорт распространился из Турана и Ирана через Великий шелковый путь
https://ok.ru/video/1357665602157
Polo at Gilgit, North Pakistan – How an Ancient Imperial Sport spread from Turan & Iran across the Silk Road
https://vk.com/video434648441_456240156
Πόλο στο Γκιλγκίτ, Πακιστάν – Διάδοση ενός Πανάρχαιου Αθλήματος πάνω στους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού
Περισσότερα:
Το πόλο – αρχικά γνωστό σε αρχαία ιρανικά κείμενα ως τσαουκάν – είναι ένα τουρανικό – ιρανικό άθλημα του οποίου οι απαρχές χάνονται στην Κεντρική Ασία της 2ης προχριστιανικής χιλιετίας. Αν η θήρα λεόντων ήταν το αυτοκρατορικό άθλημα των Ασσυρίων μοναρχών κι αν η θήρα ιπποποτάμων ήταν το βασιλικό άθλημα των Αιγυπτίων φαραώ, το κατ’ εξοχήν άθλημα των Αχαιμενιδών σάχηδων κι όλων των διαδόχων τους μέχρι τα μέσα ισλαμικά και τα νεώτερα χρόνια ήταν το πόλο (τσαουκάν σε μέσα περσικά και τσοβγάν σε νέα περσικά).
Καθώς το άθλημα αγαπήθηκε στο Θιβέτ, στην Κίνα, στην Ινδία. και στην Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία, ήταν ένα ακόμη τουρανικό – ιρανικό πολιτισμικό στοιχείο που χάρη στους Δρόμους του Μεταξιού διαδόθηκε σε όλες τις μεγάλες χώρες του προαναγεννησιακού κόσμου.
Το όνομα, με το οποίο το έμαθαν οι Άγγλοι στην Ινδία και στην συνέχεια το διέδωσαν σε άλλα μέρη του κόσμου, είναι ωστόσο όχι το τουρανικό – ιρανικό όνομά του αλλά το θιβετιανό όνομα του αθλήματος. Πούλου σημαίνει μπάλα στην θιβετιανή γλώσσα Μπαλτί που ομιλείται και στο Γκιλγκίτ, στα βόρεια άκρα του Πακιστάν.
Το θιβετιανό όνομα του αθλήματος διέδωσαν στην Ινδία Τούρκοι και Μογγόλοι που συχνά από στρατιώτες και στρατηγοί έγιναν αυτοκράτορες στο Δελχί. Ένας απ’ αυτούς μάλιστα σκοτώθηκε σε αγώνα πόλο – ο Κουτμπουντίν Αϊμπάκ που βασίλεψε ως σουλτάνος στο Δελχί από το 1206 μέχρι το 1210.
Το πόλο έγινε αυτοκρατορικό άθλημα επίσης στην Κίνα ήδη από την εποχή της δυναστείας Τανγκ (7ος – 10ος αι) και σε αυτοκρατορικούς τάφους βρίσκονται αγαλματίδια αθλητών πόλο είτε ανδρών είτε γυναικών. Συνέβαλε στην διάδοση του πόλο στην Κίνα η παρουσία των εκεί καταφυγόντων μελών της ιρανικής σασανιδικής δυναστείας που δεν αποδέχθηκαν την κατάκτηση του Ιράν από τους πρώιμους μουσουλμάνους στρατιώτες.
Στην Κωνσταντινούπολη το πόλο διαδόθηκε αρκετά νωρίς και στα χρόνια του Θεοδοσίου Β’ (408-450) αναγέρθηκε ολόκληρο Τζυκανιστήριο ώστε να παίζουν οι ευγενείς Ρωμιοί το … Τζυκάνιον (παραφθορά του περσικού τσαουκάν). Τζυκανιστήρια υπήρχαν επίσης στην Τραπεζούντα, την Έφεσο και αλλού. Ο λόγος που το άθλημα λατρεύθηκε από αριστοκρατίες και αυλές είναι απλός: αποτελεί εξαιρετική εκπαίδευση και προετοιμασία για το αυτοκρατορικό ιππικό μιας χώρας.
Ωστόσο, πουθενά αλλού το άθλημα δεν λατρεύτηκε περισσότερο από όσο ανάμεσα στους Πέρσες του Ιράν και τους Τουρανούς της Κεντρικής Ασίας. Ο λόγος είναι απλός: οι καταβολές του είναι από εκεί κι ανάμεσα σε Τουρανούς κι Ιρανούς το πόλο έγινε αντικείμενο μακροσκελέστατων επικών συνθέσεων. Ο εθνικός ποιητής του Ισλαμικού Ιράν Φερντοουσί κάνει λόγο για το πόλο που έπαιζε ένας από τα πιο σημαντικά πρόσωπα του ιρανικού θρύλου: ο Σιγιαβάς, γιος του Σάχη Κεϊκαούς.
Η ιστορία του Σιγιαβάς, Ιρανού διαδόχου του θρόνου που για να αποδείξει την αθωότητά του πρέπει να καταφύγει στον Αφρασιάμπ, βασιλιά του Τουράν, είναι από τα σημαντικώτερα σημεία του Σαχναμέ,του τεράστιου επικού ποιήματος του Φερντοουσί.
Ωστόσο οι εναλλαγές κι οι αντικατοπτρισμοί είναι έντονοι και το Καλό και το Κακό παίζουν περίεργα παιχνίδια ενοχής κι αθωότητας για τους ήρωες της Καϋανικής Δυναστείας που μέσα στο έργο του Φερντοουσί προηγείται της Αρσακιδικής Δυναστείας (Ασκανιάν) αλλά δεν μπορεί να ταυτιστεί με την ιστορική δυναστεία των Αχαιμενιδών που όντως στην Ιστορία προηγήθηκαν των Αρσακιδών. Ο συμβολικός χρόνος στο έργο του Φερντοουσί έχει τελείως άλλη υπόσταση και χρησιμεύει ώστε να περιγράφονται αποκαλυπτικά κι εσχατολογικά στοιχεία ως υπόθεση του παρελθόντος αν και ανήκουν ουσιαστικά στο μέλλον.
Έτσι ο Αφρασιάμπ σκοτώνει τον Σιγιαβάς του οποίου το όνομα αρχικά σήμαινε κυριολεκτικά “αυτός με το μαύρο άλογο” αλλά κατέληξε ως ‘σαβάς’ (Savaş) να σημαίνει στα τουρκικά ‘πόλεμος’.
Σχετικά:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siyâvash
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afrasiab
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kay_K%C4%81vus
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kay_Khosrow
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Η ιστορία του Αρχαίου Αθλήματος Τσαουκάν – Τζικάνιον:
The game first played in Persia (Iran) at dates given from the 5th century BC, or much earlier, to the 1st century AD and originated there, polo was at first a training game for cavalry units, usually the king’s guard or other elite troops. To the warlike tribesmen, who played it with as many as 100 to a side, it was a miniature battle. In time polo became an Iranian national sport played normally by the nobility.
Women as well as men played the game, as indicated by references to the queen and her ladies engaging King Khosrow II Parviz and his courtiers in the 6th century AD. Certainly Persian literature and art give us the richest accounts of polo in antiquity. Ferdowsi, the famed Iranian poet-historian, gives a number of accounts of royal polo tournaments in his 9th century epic, Shahnameh (the Epic of Kings). In the earliest account, Ferdowsi romanticizes an international match between Turanian force and the followers of Siyâvash, a legendary Iranian prince from the earliest centuries of the Empire; the poet is eloquent in his praise of Siyâvash’s skills on the polo field.
Ferdowsi also tells of Emperor Shapur II of the Sassanid dynasty of the 4th century who learned to play polo when he was only seven years old. Naqsh-i Jahan Square in Isfahan is in fact a polo field which was built by king Abbas I in 17th century. Naqsh-e Jahan Square in Isfahan is the site of a medieval royal polo field.
Sultan Qutb-ud-din Aibak, the Turkic Emperor of North India, ruled as an emperor for only four years, from 1206 to 1210 but died accidentally in 1210 playing polo. While he was playing a game of polo on horseback (also called chougan in Persia), his horse fell and Aibak was impaled on the pommel of his saddle. He was buried near the Anarkali bazaar in Lahore (which is now in Pakistan). Aibak’s son Aram, died in 1211 CE [2], so Shams-ud-din Iltutmish, another ex-slave of Turkic ancestry who was married to Aibak’s daughter, succeeded him as Sultan of Delhi.
From Persia, in medieval times polo spread to the Byzantines (who called it tzykanion), and after the Muslim conquests to the Ayyubid and Mameluke dynasties of Egypt and the Levant, whose elites favored it above all other sports. Notable sultans such as Saladin and Baybars were known to play it and encourage it in their court. Polo sticks were features on the Mameluke precursor to modern day playing cards.
A Persian miniature from the poem Guy-o Chawgân (“the Ball and the Polo-mallet”) during Safavid dynasty of Persia, which shows Persian courtiers on horseback playing a game of polo, 1546 AD
Later on Polo was passed from Persia to other parts of Asia including the Indian subcontinent and China, where it was very popular during the Tang Dynasty and frequently depicted in paintings and statues. Valuable for training cavalry, the game was played from Constantinople to Japan by the Middle Ages, known in the East as the Game of Kings. The name polo is said to have been derived from the Tibetan word “pulu”, meaning ball. https://royalpoloclubrasnov.ro/history-of-polo/
Επίσης:
https://irandoostan.com/polo-or-chogan-the-unesco-intangible-cultural-heritage-of-persia/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polo#Origins
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chovgan
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tzykanisterion
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Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/ss-250620160
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/polo_games_war_games_the_tzykanisterion_of_const
https://vk.com/doc429864789_620278896
https://www.docdroid.net/LUrtK69/polo-polemos-to-tzikanistirion-konstantinoypoleos-oi-dromoi-toy-metaksiou-ki-oi-toyranikes-iranikes-baseis-tis-romiosynis-pdf
"Presidente Andreotti": Giulio Andreotti, the Greatest Statesman of Post-WWII World
ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ ΑΠΟ ΤΟ ΣΗΜΕΡΑ ΑΝΕΝΕΡΓΟ ΜΠΛΟΓΚ “ΟΙ ΡΩΜΙΟΙ ΤΗΣ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗΣ”
Το κείμενο του κ. Νίκου Μπαϋρακτάρη είχε αρχικά δημοσιευθεί την 29η Απριλίου 2018.
Ο κ. Μπαϋρακτάρης παρουσιάζει μέρος της συζήτησης και του διαλόγου τον οποίο διεξήγαγα με το ακροατήριο μιας διάλεξής μου στο Πεκίνο τον Ιανουάριο του 2018 αναφορικά με το ποιος είναι ένας πραγματικά ισχυρός ηγεμόνας (ή 'πολιτικός' - !!) και σχετικά με τα καίρια κριτήρια τα οποία καθορίζουν την πραγματική ισχύ ενός ανθρώπου γενικώτερα. Αυτά δεν έχουν τίποτα το κοινό με φυσική/σωματική ισχύ, οικονομική υποστήριξη, πολιτική-κομματική διασύνδεση, ή την όποια μορφωτική ('επιστημονική') γνώση (δηλαδή: αποβλάκωση). Η πραγματική ισχύς δεν φαίνεται: δεν είναι υλική, αλλά εξολοκλήρου ψυχική. Και είναι για απειροελάχιστους, οι οποίοι δεν έχουν κανένα ενδιαφέρον να επιδείξουν την ισχύ τους σε άλλους. Η αληθινή Ιστορία, δηλαδή το Γίγνεσθαι, είναι μυστικό.
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https://greeksoftheorient.wordpress.com/2018/04/29/presidente-andreotti-ο-μεγαλύτερος-πολιτικός-του-μετα/ =============================
Οι Ρωμιοί της Ανατολής – Greeks of the Orient
Ρωμιοσύνη, Ρωμανία, Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία
Σε προηγούμενο κείμενό μου σχετικά με τον Ντόναλντ Τραμπ, αναφέρθηκα στον Τζούλιο (Ιούλιο) Αντρεόττι, μυθική μορφή της μεταπολεμικής Ιταλίας και της διεθνούς πολιτικής. Πιο συγκεκριμένα, ολοκλήρωσα το κείμενό μου εκείνο με την εξής παράγραφο:
Όμως, εφόσον κάνουμε τόσες συγκρίσεις, δεν νομίζω ότι ο Τραμπ έχει την ικανότητα να περνάει με τόση ευκολία καθημερινά ανάμεσα σε τόσες πολλές σφαίρες που σφυρίζουν και για έξι δεκαετίες, όπως ένας Τζούλιο Αντρεόττι.
Με τον Πάπα Πίο ΙΒ’ (Εουτζένιο Πατσέλι) το 1953
Με την ευκαιρία της συμπλήρωσης πέντε ετών από τον θάνατο του βετεράνου της παγκόσμιας εξουσίας (6 Μαΐου 2013 σε ηλικία 94 ετών), αφιερώνω ένα σύντομο κείμενο με ασυνήθιστες αναφορές που δεν βρίσκονται εύκολα στα ΜΜΕ στον ‘Βεελζεβούλ’ ή στον ‘θεϊκό Ιούλιο’ – όπως τον δει κάποιος!
Giulio Andreotti, il Divo – Τζούλιο Αντρεόττι, ο Θεϊκός
Επονομασμένος και … Βεελζεβούλ!
45 χρόνια βουλευτής (υπουργός και πρωθυπουργός) και στη συνέχεια 22 χρόνια ισόβιος γερουσιαστής (ως τιμητική διάκριση): 67 χρόνια σε έδρανα δημόσιου βίου!
Il potere logora chi non ce l’ha – Η εξουσία φθείρει εκείνον που δεν την έχει
Ο μεγαλύτερος πολιτικός δεν είναι ο πλουσιώτερος από τους πολιτικούς, ή ο ισχυρώτερος, ή εκείνος που τον φοβούνται πιο πολύ, ή εκείνος που κάνει τα πιο εντυπωσιακά κι απρόσμενα πράγματα, γιατί όλα αυτά οφείλονται στην πραγματικότητα σε επιτελεία και σε παρασκηνιακές οργανώσεις που κινούν ως μαριονέτες εκείνους που ο μέσος ηλίθιος άνθρωπος θεωρεί ‘πανίσχυρους’.
Βεελζεβούλ και Βηλφεγώρ
Ο Τζούλιο Αντρεόττι, κορυφαίο στέλεχος των Ιησουϊτών, με τον μεγάλο του αντίπαλο, τον Λίτσιο Τζέλι, σεβάσμιο της μασωνικής στοάς Ρ2 και οργανωτή μιας πλειάδας αποπειρών δολοφονίας του Ιταλού πολιτικού.
Τους ονόμαζαν Βεελζεβούλ και Βηλφεγώρ.
Ο Λίτσιο Τζέλι (γεννημένος την ίδια χρονιά με τον Αντρεόττι, πέθανε δυο χρόνια μετά από κείνον / 1919-2015) είχε την ψυχική ισχύ να περάσει μέσα από τα τείχη των φυλακών, όπου τον είχαν κλείσει, αόρατος, και να μετατοπιστεί ακαριαία σε τεράστια απόσταση γελοιοποιώντας όσους κρύβοντας τη δική τους δύναμη ήθελαν να κάνουν εκείνον να δείξει τη δική του.
Ασχολούμενοι με τους δύο κορυφαίους της παγκόσμιας εξουσίας αφήνουμε τα ανθρώπινα και προσεγγίζουμε τα θεϊκά, υπερβατικά-ψυχικά επίπεδα ύπαρξης για τα οποία οι ψευτοθρησκείες των δήθεν πιστών είναι τιποτένιες αφηγήσεις κι αισχρή υποκρισία ξωφλημένη και προκαταδικασμένη να εξαφανιστεί στα επόμενα 10-20 χρόνια.
Και μαζί της κι όλη η σαββούρα των σημερινών ψευτοθρησκειών….
Κάνω λόγο για ‘θεϊκά επίπεδα ύπαρξης’.
Σωστά.
Ή σατανικά…….
Ο μεγαλύτερος πολιτικός δεν ο πιο μορφωμένος, ο πιο φιλοσοφημένος, ή ο πιο ιδεολόγος, επειδή οι υλι(στι)κές επιστήμες είναι μια παραχάραξη της αλήθειας, η φιλοσοφία αποτελεί από μόνη της αποδοχή προσωπικής έλλειψης της Σοφίας, οι ιδεολογίες και θεωρίες είναι ένα σκουπιδαριό και μια πολύ χαμηλή τακτική αποβλάκωσης των μαζών, κι η όποια ”μόρφωση είναι απλά συσσώρευση αχρήστων βλακειών που έχουν συγγράψει άνθρωποι τιποτένιοι, ανίσχυροι κι ολότελα ξεκομμένοι από την ψυχή τους – αντίθετα από το τι συνέβαινε στον Τζούλιο Αντρεόττι και στον Λίτσιο Τζέλι.
Ο μεγαλύτερος πολιτικός ή ηγέτης ή ηγεμών είναι εκείνος που δεν φοβάται να περάσει ανάμεσα σε σφαίρες που σφυρίζουν, γιατί γνωρίζει ότι έχει την ψυχική παντοδυναμία (ή αν θέλετε τα σωστά συντεταγμένα ηλεκτρομαγνητικά ρευστά του σώματός του) να τις εξοστρακίζει.
Κι ο Τζούλιο Αντρεόττι έκανε αυτό καθημερινά και για πολλές δεκαετίες.
Καμμιά από τις αναρίθμητες κι αποτυχημένες απόπειρες δολοφονίας του δεν αναφέρθηκε δημόσια.
Όποιος έχει την δύναμη δεν την δείχνει.
Γι’ αυτό κι αποκλήθηκε ο Αντρεόττι indecifrabile – μη αποκρυπτογραφήσιμος.
Non ho un temperamento avventuroso e giudico pericolose le improvvisazioni emotive. […] Lavorare molto m’è sempre piaciuto. È una… utile deformazione. Presidente Andreotti
Τζούλιο Αντρεόττι χορεύει δημοτικούς χορούς από την επίσκεψή του στα Γιάννινα στα τέλη του 1980.
Σε μοναστήρι του νομού Ιωαννίνων
Mi faccio una colpa di provare simpatia per Andreotti. È il più spiritoso di tutti. Mi diverte il suo cinismo, che è un cinismo vero, una particolare filosofia con la quale è nato. Montanelli
è distaccato, freddo, guardingo, ha sangue di ghiaccio. […] È autenticamente colto, cioè di quelli che non credono che la cultura sia cominciata con la sociologia e finisca lì. Montanelli
https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giulio_Andreotti
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più realista di Bismarck, più tempista di Talleyrand […] La sua smagliante conversazione sarebbe piaciuta a Voltaire, i suoi libri non sarebbero dispiaciuti a Sainte-Beuve. Roberto Gervaso
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A joke about Andreotti (originally seen in a strip by Stefano Disegni and Massimo Caviglia) had him receiving a phone call from a fellow party member, who pleaded with him to attend judge Giovanni Falcone’s funeral. His friend supposedly begged, “The State must give an answer to the Mafia, and you are one of the top authorities in it!” To which a puzzled Andreotti asked, “Which one do you mean?”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giulio_Andreotti
Στη Μόσχα το 1973
Στην Παλμύρα της Συρίας το 1989
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Περισσότερα:
https://el.wikipedia.org/wiki/Τζούλιο_Αντρεότι
http://unmondoimpossibile.blogspot.com/2015/10/giulio-andreotti-come-fecero-fuori.html
http://giulioandreotti.org/it
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Κατεβάστε την αναδημοσίευση σε Word doc.:
https://www.slideshare.net/MuhammadShamsaddinMe/presidente-andreotti
https://issuu.com/megalommatis/docs/presidente_andreotti.docx
https://vk.com/doc429864789_621710290
https://www.docdroid.net/0ouL4w6/presidente-andreotti-o-meghalyteros-politikos-toy-metapolemikou-kosmoy-docx
Ουλλικούμμι, Χιττιτική Εσχατολογία και Τοπογραφία του Ψυχικού Σύμπαντος
Με θέματα χιττιτικής και χουριτικής κοσμογονίας, κοσμολογίας και εσχατολογίας είχα ασχοληθεί ήδη κατά την διάρκεια των σπουδών μου και από την αρχή των ανατολιστικών ερευνών μου. Όμως το αποκαλυπτικό χιττιτικό έπος χαρακτηρίζεται από μία ιδιαιτερότητα, η οποία δεν εντοπίζεται σε καμμία άλλη εσχατολογία και σωτηριολογία. Σε όλα τα άλλα κείμενα, σε κάθε άλλη θρησκεία, υπερβατική σοφία, και μυθολογία, όλη η αφήγηση περιστρέφεται γύρω από μία μεσσιανική μορφή Σωτήρα. Και το κείμενο είναι γραμμένο από ιερείς οι οποίοι περιπαθώς τον αναμένουν.
Αλλά στο Ουλλικούμμι οι περιγραφές γίνονται και η πλοκή υπάρχει με μόνο σκοπό να παρουσιαστούν τα καθέκαστα έτσι όπως αυτά επινοήθηκαν και επιτελέσθηκαν από τον Κουμαρμπί – μία παράξενη μορφή 'θεού', ο οποίος στρέφεται εναντίον της παλαιάς τάξης όψεων του Θείου, οι οποίες είχαν προκύψει με την Δημιουργία. Για τον σκοπό αυτό μάλιστα δημιουργεί τον λίθινο γίγναντα – θηρίο Ουλλικούμμι. Ο Κουμαρμπί επέχει δηλαδή την θέση του Δράκοντος (Σατανα) στην χριστιανική Αποκάλυψη και ο Ουλλικούμμι αντιστοιχεί στο Θηρίον (Αντίχριστο).
Στις 24 Νοεμβρίου 1990, είχα δώσει μία διάλεξη στην Νέα Ακρόπολη (Καλλιθέα) με τίτλο 'Μύθος και Αποκάλυψη από τους Χουρίτες και τους Χιττίτες ως τον Ιωάννη'. Το ηχητικό (σε όχι πολύ καλή κατάσταση) ευρίσκεται εδώ:
Το όλο θέμα εγείρει πολλά ερωτήματα είτε σε ιστορικό-γλωσσικό-λεξικογραφικό επίπεδο, είτε αναφορικά με θέματα ιστορίας θρησκειών και μυθολογίας, είτε ως προς τις ίδιες τις ψυχικές διεργασίες, οι οποίες επιτελέσθηκαν από τους Χιττίτες αρχιερείς και μύστες, οι οποίοι είχαν σκοπό να βιώσουν υπερβατικά το απώτατο μέλλον που αφηγήθηκαν έμμετρα στη συνέχεια.
Περιεχόμενα
Εισαγωγή
Ι. Ιστορικά στοιχεία
ΙΙ. Ιστορικο-θρησκευτικά στοιχεία και σύγχρονη επιστήμη
ΙΙΙ. Ανύπαρκτος ο Κουμαρμπί και Ναζιστές οι παραχαράκτες
ΙV. Κουμαρμπί και Τεσούμπ
V. Μεθοδολογικά προβλήματα
VI. Όταν ιερείς του Αντιχρίστου εσχατολογούν για τον Μεσσία
VII. Η νίκη του Μεσσία γραμμένη από αντι-μεσσιανικό χέρι
VIII. Ψυχικές ενέργειες και διαδικασίες κατά την υπερβατική βίωση του μέλλοντος
IX. Το ψυχικό σύμπαν και η τοπογραφία του
X. Ο χώρος της εκπόρευσης μορφών στο ψυχικό σύμπαν
XΙ. Ο άξονας Είναι και Γίγνεσθαι και η εκπόρευση μορφών
XII. Η υπερβατική βίωση του 'μέλλοντος' και οι νόμοι της
XIII. Όταν βλέπεις τον Τασμισού ως Ουλλικούμμι και ανάστροφα
XIV. Πως ο Κουμαρμπί-Σατανάς θα δημιουργήσει τον Ουλλικούμμι-Αντίχριστο
XV. Η νίκη του Τασμισού και η μεγάλη πολιτεία του Τέλους
XVI. Καισάρεια, Ιερουσαλήμ, Ήλιος, Κουμαρμπί και Γιαχβέ
XVII. Ουλλικούμμι: η σατανική αντι-Δημιουργία
Содержание
Введение
I. Элементы исторических свидетельств
II. Историко-религиозные данные и современная наука
III. Несуществующий Кумарби и нацистские фальшивомонетчики
IV. Кумарби и Тешуб
V. Методологические проблемы
VI. Жрецы Антихриста и их эсхатологические ссылки на Мессию
VII. Победа Мессии написана антимессианской рукой
VIII. Духовные действия и процессы в трансцендентном опыте будущего
IX. Духовная вселенная и ее топография
X. Пространство эманации форм в духовной вселенной
XI. Ось Бытия и Становления и эманация форм
XII. Трансцендентальный опыт «будущего» и его законов
XIII. Когда вы видите Ташмишу (Tašmišu) как Улликумми, и наоборот
XIV. Как Кумарби-Сатана создаст Улликумми-Антихриста
XV. Победа Ташмишу (Tašmišu) и великий город Конца
XVI. Кесария, Иерусалим, бог Солнца, Кумарби и Яхве
XVII. Улликумми: сатанинское анти-творение
Contents
Introduction
I. Elements of historical evidence
II. Historical-religious data and modern science
III. The nonexistent Kumarbi and the Nazi forgers
IV. Kumarbi and Teshub
V. Methodological problems
VI. The priests of the Antichrist and their eschatological references to the Messiah
VII. Messiah's victory written by an anti-messianic hand
VIII. Spiritual actions and processes in the transcendental experience of the future
IX. The spiritual universe and its topography
X. The space of the emanation of forms in the spiritual universe
XI. The axis of Being and Becoming, and the emanation of forms
XII. The transcendental experience of the 'future' and its laws
XIII. When you see Tasmisu (Tašmišu) as Ullikummi, and vice versa
XIV. How Kumarbi-Satan will create Ullikummi-Antichrist
XV. The victory of Tasmisu (Tašmišu) and the great city of the End
XVI. Caesarea, Jerusalem, the Sun-god, Kumarbi and Yahweh
XVII. Ullikummi: the Satanic anti-Creation
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